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Making Copyright Whole:
A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions and
Limitations
Daniel J. Gervais*

THIS ARTICLE SUGGESTS A PATH TO DEVELOP A PRINCIPLED CONCEPTUALIZATION for copyright of
limitations and exceptions at the international level. The paper argues that, normatively, copyright has always
sought to reflect a balance between protection and access. It demonstrates that this balance was present to
the minds of the negotiators of the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
and may have been somewhat overlooked in revisions of the Convention. It was ultimately replaced by a
three-step test designed to restrict the ability of individual legislators to create limitations and exceptions.
The article also considers the conflicts between copyright and rights such as the right to privacy, human
rights principles of free expression and cultural diversity, the right to information, the right to education, and
the nascent right to development, all of which imply striking a balance in intellectual property protection.
The article begins with a historical look at the public interest foundations of the Beine Convention and its
revisions until 1971. The article then proceeds to a conceptualization of limitations and exceptions in order
to show the policy linkages of each type of exception and proposes a set of principles for limitations and
exceptions. The article also examines the meaning and impact of the three-step test because it would be
pointless, not theoretically, but from a policy perspective, to ignore the application of the test in suggesting
international principles for limitations and exceptions.
DANS CET ARTICLE, ON PROPOSE UN MOYEN D'ELABORER UNE CONCEPTUALISATION, fondde sur des
principes, des limites et exceptions en matiere de droit d'auteur au niveau international. Dans le texte, on
soutient que, de maniere normative, le droit d'auteur a toujours cherch6
refleter un equilibre entre
protection et acc~s. Dans cet article, on d6montre que cet 6quilibre 6tait pr6sent clans I'esprit des
n6gociateurs de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des ceuvres litt6raireset artistiques en 1886, mais
qu'il aurait 6t6 quelque peu laiss6 de c6t6 lors des r6visions de la Convention. Cette pr6occupation d'6quilibre
aurait finalement 6t6 remplac6e par un critbre en trois volets destin6 6 restreindre la capacit6 des l6gislateurs
individuels de creer des limites et des exceptions. Dans cet article, on examine 6galement les conflits entre
le droit d'auteur et d'autres droits tels que le droit a la vie priv6e, les principes des droits de la personne que
sont la libre expression et la diversite culturelle, le droit a I'information, I'egalit6 des chances en 6ducation, et
le droit naissant au d6veloppement, tous ces droits impliquant qu'il faille r6aliser un equilibre en matiere de
protection de la propri6t6 intellectuelle. Le texte d6bute par un aperqu historique des fondements de l'int6ret
public de la Convention de Berne et de ses r6visions jusqu'en 1971. 1'article se poursuit en proposant une
conceptualisation des limitations et exceptions afin de d6montrer les liens politiques de chaque des
exceptions et propose un ensemble de principes applicables aux limites et aux exceptions. Cet article
examine en outre la signification et I'incidence de ce critere en trois 6tapes dans la mesure ou il serait sans
int6r6t, non pas sur un plan th6orique, mais selon une perspective de politique, de faire fi de I'application du
critere en proposant des principes internationaux pour r6gir les limites et les exceptions.

Copyright 2008 © by Daniel J.Gervais.
Acting Dean, University Research Chair in Intellectual Property and Osler Professor of Law.Though the author takes full
responsibility for the ideas expressed inthis paper, the author is grateful to Professors Pamela Samuelson, Ruth Okediji, P
Bernt Hugenholtz and Justin Hughes and participants in the OSI workshop on limitations and exceptions held at Cardozo
Law School in December 2007 for their most helpful comments.
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Making Copyright Whole:
A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions
and Limitations
Daniel J. Gervais

Le livre, comme livre, appartient a I'auteur, mais comme pens6e, il appartientle mot n'est pas trop vaste-au genre humain. Toutes les intelligences y ont
droit. Si I'un des deux droits, le droit de 1'6crivain et le droit de I'esprit
humain, devait 6tre sacrifie, ce serait, certes, le droit de 1'6crivain, car I'int6r6t
public est notre preoccupation unique, et tous, je le declare, doivent passer
avant nous [...] Constatons la propri6t6 litt6raire, mais, en m6me temps,
fondons le domaine public.
-Victor Hugo, Discours d'ouverture du Congras litt6raire international de 1878

1. INTRODUCTION

recognize, contrary to
Manichean debates that have emerged in the past few years, that the public
interest requires the protection of authors and users of their works, and to
recognize that both authors and users require a functioning copyright system.
THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE COPYRIGHT WHOLE, to

The purpose of this Article is to contribute to the development of a

principled conceptualization for copyright of limitations and exceptions2 at the
international level. The paper argues that normatively, copyright has always
sought to reflect a balance3 between protection and what is now known as
1.

There is no good translation of this quote (that I could find). The three main thoughts are as follows:
a)

A book belongs to its author but the ideas belong to humankind.

b)

If either the right ofthe writer or the right of the human spirit must be forfeited
("sacrificed"),i is assuredly the right of the writer that must be, because public
interest is the sole preoccupation and must come before everything else.

c)

One must recognize literary property, but at the same time establish ("fourd)
the public domain.

Victor Hugo, Discours d'ouverture du Congres litteraire internationalde 1878
2.

3.

<http://www.irlibroveritas.ret/lire/oeuvre1923.html>
at pp. 5-6.
In this Article, "limitation" refers to conditions on the exercise of copyright, including transforming an
exclusive right into a right to remuneration (e.g. a compulsory license). An "exception" is a full ron
application of the exclusive right in a specific situation.
1am fully aware that this term is imprecise. I will ask the reader to bear with me as I will attempt to defire it
later on in the paper.

(2008) 5:1&2 UOLTJ 1
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"access" in myriad forms, but that this balance, which was very present to the
minds of the negotiators of the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, 4 may have been somewhat overlooked in revisions of
the Convention. It was ultimately replaced by a "test," the three-step test,
designed to restrict the ability of individual legislators to create the limitations
and exceptions used to maintain this balance.
The degree of complexity of the exercise reflects the fact that copyright
is increasingly sparring with rights outside of its own sphere, such as the right to
privacy, human rights principles of free expression and cultural diversity and
cultural development, the right to information, the right to education, and the
nascent right to development, each of which implies striking a balance in
intellectual property protection.
Part 2 of this Article begins with a historical look at the public interest
foundations of the Berne Convention and its successive revisions until 1971. This
effort to "go back to basics" will demonstrate that (a) the protection of authors
was instituted internationally in the public interest; (b) there is no contradiction
between the protection of authors and the public interest; and (c)the public
interest requires a well-functioning system that includes appropriate limitations
and exceptions. The analysis will also show that limitations and exceptions are
largely unregulated policy space at the international level. This has led to a lack
of uniformity and harmony among national and regional implementations of
limitations and exceptions allowed under the main international treaties,
especially the Berne Convention.
Part 2 then proceeds to a conceptualization of limitations and exceptions
in order to better understand the policy linkages of each type of exception. Part
2 concludes with a proposed set of principles for limitations and exceptions.
Part 3 examines the meaning and impact of the three-step test in
establishing international principles for limitations and exceptions. Originally
conceived as a political compromise to limit exceptions to the right of
reproduction in the Berne Convention, the three-step test has become the single
sieve through which all, or almost all, exceptions to exclusive copyright rights
must pass to be compatible with the TRIPS Agreement.' It would be pointless,
not theoretically, but from a policy perspective, to ignore the application of the
test in suggesting international principles for limitations and exceptions.
The analysis contained in Part 3 goes beyond a simple overview of the
three-step test as interpreted by WTO dispute-settlement panels. It examines
also the normative locus of the test and its possible application directly in
national legislation. The Article concludes with a brief look at ways in which the
principles identified in Part 2 could be implemented internationally in light of the
constraints imposed by the three-step test.

4.

5.

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (9September 1886), 1161 United Nations
Treaty Series3,<http://www.wipoirt/treaties/en/ip/berre/trtdocs wo001.html>, as lastrevisedat Parisor
24 July1971 and lastamended 28 September 1979 [Berne Convention].
World Trade OrganizationAgreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (15 April

1994), <http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal
e/27-trips.pdf>, (1994) 33:1International Legal Materials
1197, 1869 United Nations Treaty Series 299 (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade
Orgarization, Annex 1C) [TRIPS Agreement].

(2008) 5:1&2 UJOLTJ 1
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2. THE ROLE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
2.1. Current Limitations and Exceptions in the Berne Convention
and the TRIPS Agreement
2.1.1. The 1886 Text of the Berne Convention
by the Association litt~raire
internationale, the predecessor of the present-day Association litt6raire et
artistique internationale (ALAI). 6 Its first president was the famous French author
and human rights campaigner Victor Hugo, perhaps the best known advocate for
the Romantic Movement so closely associated with the natural rights foundation
of authors' rights. Romantics saw creative works as extensions of their authors.
But they also believed in the power of individuals to influence and shape events.
Victor Hugo wrote (in the same speech excerpted above) that "literature was the
government of humankind by the human spirit."7
The traditional insistence on the filiation between authors' rights and
Romanticism offers an incomplete picture, however, one that remains incomplete
to this day. Yet, Hugo's words were abundantly clear ; the sole preoccupation in
protecting the author was and is the public interest. It is from this perspective
that he refers expressly to the exclusion of ideas from copyright, a notion that is
well established in both major (Western) legal systems. Two examples should
suffice. First, section 102(b) of the US Copyright Act8 excludes ideas, procedures,
processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, and discoveries
from the scope of protection. Second, every French treatise on copyright (literary
and artistic property, that is) mentions at least once that "les idles sont de libre
parcours" (ideas should circulate freely).9
Hugo also wrote that if a conflict should arise between the rights of the
author and those of "the human spirit," the latter should prevail. This means that
copyright protection should cease to apply once the goal of maximizing welfare
by ensuring that new works are created without stifling the potential for new
ones (i.e. that copyright protection should go no further than is required to
"promote the progress of science and useful arts"10). This would seem to mesh
rather well also with economic analyses of copyright that look for a (measurable)
optimal protection point at which creation and dissemination of new works is not
THE SEED OF THE BERNE CONVENTION WAS sown

6.

7.

Association Litteraire etArtistique Internationale, <http://www.alai.org>

"La litt rature, c'est le gouvernement du genre humair par 1'esprit humair." Hugo "Discours," supra note 1
at p. 3.

8.
9.

US Copyri9ht Law, (1976) 17 United States Code 512, 90:2 United States Statutes at Large 2541, <http://
www.copyright.gov/titlel 7/92chap1.pdf>, at s. 102(b) [US Copyright Act].
For example, in Aro6 Lucas ard Henri Jacques Lucas, Traite de la propriete litteraire et artistique, 3d ed.

(Litee, 2006) the authors explain: "C'est un prineipe fondamental du droit de la propri~t6 intelleetuelle que

10.

les id~es sort en elles-mes de libre parcours. La regle a te presentee comme une concessior
a I'intret
de la soc6t6" (no. 28 at p. 31).
Constitution of the United States of America (1787), <http://avalonlaw.yale.edu/18th-ce tury/usconst.
aspml> at art. 1, s. 8. See also Jare Ginsburg, "A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary property in Revolutionary
France ard America," (1990) 64 Tulane Law Review 991 1032, at p. 992.

6
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negated by deadweight and other welfare losses.11
The translation of this foundational role of the public interest thus was to
protect authors for the personal contribution that they make to humankind and
the development of human "intelligence," while putting limits on such protection
when so required in the public interest, that is, when the public interest (once
again, the sole consideration) no longer dictates protecting a writer's rights.
The 1886 text of the Convention arguably met this objective. Its normative
content was minimalist. Its basic premise was to ensure that authors who were
nationals of countries that would accede to the new treaty and thus form the
"Berne Union" would be protected in all countries of the Union without
discrimination, according to the well-known principle of national treatment.
Otherwise, the original text of the Convention only contained a right of
translation.12
2.1.2. The Berne Convention Between 1886 and 1971
The evolution of the Berne Convention, which has been revised seven times (the
last in 1971), has proceeded along a single axis, namely towards the recognition
of new rights. The most fundamental right, the right of reproduction, was mostly
taken for granted, as it were, because it was fully incorporated only at the
Stockholm Revision of 1967,13 although it had existed in national laws for decades
before that, starting with the Statute of Anne of 1710.14

It would be untrue,

however, to say that the original text did not at least implicitly recognize a right
of reproduction. First, the text referred to "infringing copies," which were "liable
to seizure on importation." s It also contained a right of reproduction for
newspapers or periodicals but the right only applied if specifically asserted by the
author.16 More importantly, the 1886 text contained a partial definition of
"unlawful reproductions to which this Convention applies," which interestingly,
included

11.

Landes and Posner provide a classic statement:
Copyright protection [... trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of
providing incentives to create the work in the first place. Striking the correct balance between
access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law. For copyright law to promote
economic efficiency its principal legal doctrines must, at least approximately maximize the
benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the costs of
administering copyright protection.

12.

13.

William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "An Ecoromic Aralysis of Copyright Law," (1989) 18:2 Journal of
Legal Studies 325 33 at p. 326.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (9 September 1886) [Berne Convention
1886] in Berne Convention Centenary (WIPO, 1986), arts. 5 ard 6, at p. 228. The term of protection was ter
years. Arguably, a right of reproduction was implied because the original text cortained exceptiors (see
sectior 2.1.2). Additiorally, there is ar indirect reference to the public performarce of protected works
(there is an exclusive right ir the public performance of translations)in Article 9.
Berne Convention for the Protection ofLiterary and Artistic Works (14 July 1967), 828 United Nations Treaty
Series 11850 (revised un Stockholm o n 1 4 July 1967), <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berie/trtdocs

wo001 .html> [Stockholm Revision] at pp. 232-234. It is also at the 1967 Stockholm Revision Corfererce that
14.
15.
16.

the three-step test, to which I return below, made it into the Berne Convention.
Copyright Act, (1709) 8 Anre c. 19, <http://www.copyrighthistory.com/ane.html> [Statute ofAnne].
Berne Convention 1886, supra note 12, art. 12(l), at p. 228.
Berne Convention 1886, supra note 12, art. 7 at p. 228.

Making Copyright Whole
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unauthorized indirect appropriations of a literary or artistic work of various
kinds, such as adaptations, musical arrangements, etc., when they are only the
reproduction of a particular work, in the same form, or in another form,

without essential alterations, additions, or abridgements, so as not to present
the character of a new original work.

17

There is much that could be said about this provision. In fact, one of the ways in
which I will suggest that copyright law must be substantially revisited is the scope
of the right of adaptation (or the right to make "derivative works"). This idea will
be partly discussed in the analysis of the impact of the three-step test, below.
Put another way, apart from a limited right of reproduction and a right
of public representation for "dramatic and dramatico-musical works," 18 the most
important provision of the original Berne Convention was the inclusion of
national treatment. There were also references to exceptions, including for the
reproduction of "articles of political discussion, [...]
news of the day or
miscellaneous facts," which could not be prohibited,19 and for "use in publications
for teaching or scientific purposes, or for chrestomathies." 20 Interestingly, the
few exceptions, including the only mandatory one (news of the day, facts and
"articles of political discussion")21 contained in the Berne Convention clearly
reflected public interest considerations. In what seems a precursor to debates
about the manufacture of tools to circumvent Technical Protection Measures
(TPMs), 22 a Protocol to the 1886 text provided that the manufacture and sale of
"instruments for the mechanical reproduction of musical works in which copyright
subsists shall not be considered as constituting an infringement of musical

copyright. "23
The pattern of evolution of the Convention was then fairly linear. For
forms of exploitation invented after 1886, new rights were added at successive
Revision Conferences, as well as a few exceptions. Without providing a complete
list, here are some of the principal milestones.

17. Berne Convention 1886, supra note 12,art.
10(l) atp.228 (emphasis added).
18. Berne Convention 1886, supra note 12,art.
9(2).
19.

20.

Berne Convention 1886, supra note 12,art.7(2).

Berne Convention 1886, supra note 12,art.
8. This provision
allowed only national
legislation
to maintain
exceptiors.
21. The other exceptions arepermissive.
22. Technological tools
used to restrict
the use ofard/or access to a work.
23. Berne Convention 1886, supra note 12,Final Protocol of September 9,1886, art 3.

www.uoltj.ca

university of ottawa law & technology journal

8

24
Table 1. Evolution of Rights, Limitations and Exceptions in the Berne Convention
REVISION OR PROTOCOL
(YEAR)

NEW RIGHTS (ARTICLE)

Paris (1896)

*

Extension of reproduction right
to serial novels (must be
asserted, IV)

*

Right of adaptation applied
specifically to transformation of a
novel into a theatrical play and
vice versa

*

Term of protection of life + 50
years (7)

*

Broader translation right (8)

*

Removal of need to assert
reproduction right in serial novels
and short stories

*

New right of adaption for
mechanical reproduction and
public performance using such
reproductions (13)

*

Extension of right to obtain
seizure to such adaptations
(13(4))

*

New right of reproduction and
public performance by
cinematography (14)

*

Moral right (6bis, 9(2), 11bis(2))

*

New exclusive right of
communication by broadcasting
(11bis(1))

Berlin (1908)

Rome (1928)

NEW LIMITATIONS OR EXCEPTIONS
(A RTICLE)

Possible conditions and restrictions on
mechanical reproduction right (13)

Possible exclusion from protection of
political speeches and speeches in
legal proceedings (2bis(1))
Possible limit on right of reproduction
of lectures, addresses and sermons
(2bis(2))
Possible limit on the right of
communication by broadcasting,
including compulsory licenses (11 bis(2))

Brussels (1948)

24.

*

Broader right of translation (8)

0

Mandatory right of quotation (10(1))

*

Broader moral right (in
quotations, 10(3))

0

*

Extension of public performance
right to communications to the
public of the performance (11(1))

Possible exception to use excerpts in
educational and scientific publications
(10(2)); replaces previous possibility of
maintaining existing exceptions

*

Extension of communication right
to broadcasting or
communication by any other
means of wireless diffusion of
signs, sounds and images; any
communication to the public by
wire (cable) or rebroadcasting;
and public communication by
loudspeaker (11bis(1))

*

New right of public recitation
(11ter)

*

Broader right of adaptation,
arrangement and other alteration
(elimination of reference to new
original work as being excluded, 12)

*

Broader right in cinematographic
adaptations (now includes
distribution as well as public
performance, 14)

*

New droit de suite (resale right,
14bis(1))

Possible exception for the recording,
reproduction and public communication
of short extracts for the purpose of
reporting current events (10bis)
Possible conditions (incl. compulsory
license) on broader communication
right (11 bis(2))
*

Possible exception for ephemeral
recoding and official archiving (11bis(3))
Possible limit on resale right (14bis (2))

Not included in this table are (a) extensions of the protection to new types of works (photography, works of
applied art, cinematography, etc.), (b) definitional charges (what is "published" etc.), (c) dispute-settlement
(including a limited right to retaliate for failure to protect); and (d) administrative provisions.

Making Copyright Whole
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REVISION OR PROTOCOL
(YEAR)

NEW RIGHTS (ARTICLE)

NEW LIMITATIONS OR EXCEPTIONS
(ARTICLE)

Stockholm (1967)

0

0

Three-step test (9(2))

0

Possible limits on protection of official
texts
(2(4))

0

Right of quotation extended to all
works but must be compatible with fair
practice and the extent of use must be
justified by purpose (10(1))

*

Modification of educational exception,
limited to "by way of illustration" and
compatibility with "fair practice" but
applied also to broadcasts and
recordings (not just publications, 10(2))

0

Newspaper / periodicals reproduction
exception now applies to broadcasting
and communication and to publications
on "economic, political or religious
topics" (l0bis(1))

0

Exception for reporting current events
by photography, cinematography,
broadcasting or communication to the
public limited to "the extent justified
by the informatory purpose" (10bis(2))

0

New Appendix (providing developing
countries with the possibility of issuing
compulsory reproduction and
translation licenses, subject to a
complex administrative machinery)

0

News reporting reproduction
exception may be excluded by
rightsholder (10bis(1))

*

Broader right of public
performance and communication
(reservations no longer
mentioned, 11)

0

*

Paris (1971)

New/ broader right of
reproduction (all categories of
works, 9(1))

New right of public
communication of a recitation;
right extended to translations
(11ter)
Right of performance for
cinematographic works extended
to communication by wire (14bis)

This table shows that new rights were created to recognize that some works,
especially theatrical, musical and cinematographic, derive most of their
commercial value from their public performance (live) or communication
(distance). When exceptions or limitations were provided together with new
rights, the exceptions and limitations were often unspecified possibilities offered
to national legislators. In some cases (for example, articles 11 bis(2) and 13),
those limitations have generally taken the form of a compulsory licensing system.
In a few cases (for example, the droit de suite)), the right was introduced into the
2
Berne Convention "in principle" but essentially made optional.
While the evolution of the domain of rights is thus fairly clear, the same
cannot be said of the domain of exceptions, which remain generally unregulated
space. Most exceptions (excluding the quotation right) are only permissive; that
is, Berne member States may enact them.
The pinnacle of this development was the adoption of the three-step
test, which began its normative career as a political compromise designed to
allow, within limited confines, exceptions to be made by Berne member States
to the right of reproduction, but has since become the cornerstone of exceptions
to all copyright rights, as well as a number of industrial property rights in the
TRIPS Agreement. 26 To this rather vague test (as we will see below), one must
include the addition at the Stockholm Conference of references to fair practice
and the need to justify the extent of a use under an exception to the purpose of
the use, which thus arguably adds an evidentiary burden on users.
25.
26.

The same technique was used in the TRIPS Agreement, supra rote 5,which provides, e.g., a right for
broadcasting orgarizations (as a related or eighborirg right) at art. 14 but ther makes it optional.
TRIPS Agree mert, supra rote 5 at arts.13 (all copyright rights), 26(2) (irdustrial d e r
ard 30 (patets).

10
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Interestingly, the only mandatory exception is the quotation right, and the
only exceptions that have been part of the Berne Convention from its inception
and through the many revisions are related to news reporting and political
discussion. In that sense, and without entering here in the debate as to whether
free expression is already fully factored into copyright norms27 , or whether
constitutional protection of free expression28 might force copyright holders to
yield beyond exceptions provided for in national laws and international texts,29
there is a sense in the Berne Convention that certain public interest considerations
related to information and the press trump exclusive copyright rights.
2.1.3. Limitations and Exceptions are Unregulated Space
What remains after the brief historical overview of the evolution of the Berne
Convention is the notion that, while rights are generally well defined in the Berne
Convention, exceptions other than those related to "public information" are
unregulated internationally. Additionally, most of those unregulated exceptions
are now possibly subject to the further sieve of the three-step test. This raises a
number of issues, two of which deserve to be mentioned here. First, normatively,
the incremental elevation of the level of protection to encompass new forms of
commercial exploitation of (mostly individual) human creativity with unclear or
unspecified exceptions makes it harder to define proper boundaries for those
rights in a globalized world. The impact of this policy vacuum has been felt very
palpably on the internet, where social norms at play are interfacing with
exceptions which tend to be unclear at the national level and unspecific
internationally. The need for enforcement grows with each degree of separation
from those social norms and the resulting lack of internalization.3" In fact,
enforcement and the perception that the law is unduly harsh or misdirected in its
application will lead to more "infringement." This in itself is nothing new,31 but
this fairly obvious observation has taken on new meaning on the internet.
27.

28.
29.

30.

31.

See Michael D Birnhack, "Global Copyright, Local Speech," (2006) 24:2 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law
Journal491-547,<http://works.bepress.com/michael-birnhack/l/>; Neil W Netanel, Copyright's Paradox
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 109-152.
See L Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use," (1987) 40:1 Vanderbilt Law Review 1-66.
See Daniel J Gervais, "The Role of International Treaties in the Interpretation of Canadian Intellectual
Property Statutes," in Oonagh E Fitzgerald, ed., The Globalized Rule of Law: Relationships Between
International and Domestic Law (Irwin Law, 2006) 549-572.
See Daniel J Gervais, "The Price of Social Norms: Towards A Liability Regime for File Sharing," (2004) 12:1
Journalof intellectual Property Law 39-73, <http://ssrn.com/abstract-525083>. As Confucius stated long
ago in the Analects: "The Master said, 'Ifthe people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given
them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by
virtue, and uniformity sought to be giver them by the rules of propriety, they will hav e
sense of shame,
and moreover will become good." Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, trars. James Legge, <http://etext.
library.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748a/complete.html>, book Ir,no. 3 at p. 88.
In a speech delivered in the House of Commons (UK) 5 February 1841, <http://yarchive.ret/macaulay/
copyright.html>, Thomas Babrgtor Macaulay declared:
Those who invade copyright are regarded as knaves whotk the bread out of the mouths of
deserving men. Everybody is well pleased to see them restrained by the law, and compelled to
refund their ill-gotten gains. No tradesman of good repute will have anything to do with such
disgraceful transactions. Pass this law: and that feeling is at end. Men very different from the
present race of piratical booksellers will soon infringe this intolerable monopoly. Great masses of
capital will be constantly employed in the violation of the law. Every art will be employed to evade
legal pursuit; and the whole nation will be in the plot. [...I Remember too that, when on
tceases
to be considered as wrong and discreditable to invade literary property, no person can say where
the invasion will stop.
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In the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT),32 there are two references to the
need for balance, including one in the preamble, which refers back to the Berne
Convention: "Recognizing the need to maintain a balance between the rights of
authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, research and access
to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention [...]."33 The WCT also
incorporates the three-step test as a limit to permitted limitations and
exceptions, 34 but an Agreed Statement to that Article provides that it "neither
reduces nor extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions
permitted by the Berne Convention." 3 This statement would support the view
that the three-step test does not constitute an additional limit on limitations and
exceptions. As we will see below, it may, however, serve as a guide to their
interpretation.
A second question stems from the lack of clarity itself. For the first time in
copyright's 300-year- history,36 individual end-users, who until recently have
rarely had encounters with copyright law (no one need sign a license when
buying a copy of a book at a bookstore or a CD at a record store), suddenly have
to learn rules about what they can or cannot do legally with pictures, music,
videos, images, etc. Many users feel that restrictions on use of copyrighted
material on the internet are at odds with established practices of non-commercial
"sharing" and reusing of content, often done to create something new-a
phenomenon sometimes referred to as the "remix culture"-a form of which is
user-generated content (UGC). 3 7 Educators, who draw considerable benefits
from the great global library that is the internet, are pointing to the lack of clarity
or technological adaptability of exceptions. For example in the Canadian
Copyright Act, uses covered by educational exceptions are generally limited to
the physicality of the use (which must be "on the premises" of the educational
establishment). 38 Authors and other rightsholders also stand to lose because
users may refuse to engage, lest they partake in the emergence of a definitional
process that could result in a broadening of the scope of uses that require an
authorization (i.e. beyond applicable exceptions and limitations).
The lack of clarity follows in significant part from the fact that limitations and
exceptions remain mostly unregulated space at the international level. An
empirical study of limitations and exceptions in place in the various national legal
systems would provide an interesting mosaic of exceptions, if only because some

32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.

38.

WIPO Copyright Treaty (20 December 1996), <http://www.wipo.irt/treaties/er/ip/wct/trtdocswo033.html>,
(1997) 36 InternationalLegal Materials 65 (entry into force or 6 March 2002) [WCT].
WCT, supra note 32, preamble, last paragraph.
WCT, supra note 32, art. 10(2).
WCT, supra note 32, Agreed Statement concerring art. 10, 2d paragraph, in Agreed Statemerts
Concernirg the WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on 20 December 1996,
<http://www.wipo.irt/treaties/en/ip/wct/statements.html>.
Courted from the Statute of Anne, supra note 14.
1would take issue-but it is not the focus of this paper-with that expression. If original cortent is
generated, ther it is generated by ar author, not a "user." All authors are, in one form or another, users of
previous "content." Don't we all stand "or the shoulder of giants"? Whether reuse resulting in the creation
of a new copyright work amourts to the creation of a derivative work ard then whether it is covered by an
exception (such as fair use in the United States)-are distinct issues.
Copyright Act, (1985) Revised Statutes ofCanada ch. C-42, <http://Iaws.justice.oc.ca/en/C-42> ss. 29.4,
29.5, 29.6 ard 30.3 [Copyriqht Act].
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are expressed in ways that are very specific,3 9 while others are there essentially
to provide criteria and guidance to courts called upon to decide whether a
particular use is infringing. 40 If a common denominator could be found, this
exercise might provide a basis to argue that a "subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
[the] interpretation [of the Berne Convention]" has emerged according to article
41
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
Copyright, whether viewed as an economic lever, a utilitarian construct, 42 or
a natural rights-based doctrine, intrinsically requires balance to achieve its stated
objective. From an economic perspective, the protection needs to be sufficient
to generate new works and ensure optimal (not necessarily maximal) commercial
dissemination (where applicable) without endangering the creation of new works
or generating unreasonable welfare costs. A utilitarian analysis leads one to a
similar conclusion: protection is required to achieve the objective of generating
robust copyright industries and well-functioning markets for informational and
ideational objects, including public information and entertainment without
stifling the emergence of new works or access. Victor Hugo argued that copyright
and the public interest must go hand-in-hand, and that protection must go only
as far as the public interest (which includes the protection of authors) will dictate.

39.

For example, s.29.5of the Copyright Act, supra rote 38:
It isnotan infringement
of copyright fo r educational
insiti on ora person actingurder its
authority
todo thefollowing
actsif
theyarecore on the premises
ofan educational
institution
foreducational
ortraining
purposes and notforprofit,
before an audienceconsisting
primarily
of studentsof the educational
institutior,
instructors
actirg under the authority
of the
educatioral
institutior
or any personwho isdirectly
resporsible
for setting
a curriculum
for the
educational
institution:
(a)the
live
performarce ir public,
primarily
bystuderts oftheeducational
institutior, of awork.

40.

41.

42.

Arother example might be Article
6 of EC, European Council Directive 9112501EEC of 14 May 1991 on the
legal protection of computerprograms, [1991] Official Journal of the European Union L 122,
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-CELEX:31991 L0250:EN:HTML> [Computer
Programs Directive], which provides a very specific
right to decompile (reverse engineer) software.
A good example of course iss.107 ofthe US CopyrightAct, supra note 8, which provides fourcriteria,
codifiedin1976 from case law, to decide whether a particular
use which isother wise infrirging
is"fair
use."
The criteria
are:
(1) the purpose and character
of the use,including
whether such use isof a commercial
ratureor isforronprofit
educational
purposes;
(2) the nature
of the copyrighted
work;
(3) theamount and substatiality
oftheportion
used inrelation
tothecopyrighted work asa
whole; and
(4) theeffect ofthe useupon thepotential
market foror valueofthe copyrighted work.
Vienna Convention on the Law o Treaties (23 May 1969), <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/irstruments/
english/corventiors/ 1
1969.pdf>, 1155 United Nations Treaty Series 331,(1969) 8 International Legal
Materials 679 (entry intoforce27 Jaruary 1980) [Vienna Convention].
Which Isee as havirg a broader, if lessmeasurable, purview than ecoromic theory.
Copyright
alsoisintended
to support a system,
a macrocosm, inwhichauthors
and publishers
compete forthe attertior
and favorofthe public. [...]
The argumert for copyright
here,
to be
sure,
isar argumert of utility-but
rot mere ecoromic utility.
Utility
isfound inthefosterrig
of
a pluralism
ofopinion,
experience,
vision,
and utterance
within
theworldofauthors.
[...]
[O]ur
freedom depends rot orlyon freedom for a few, but alsoon variety,
regardless
ofthe ultimate
commingling oftruth
and error Copyright
fosters thatvariety.
David Ladd, "The Harm of the Concept of Harm inCopyright," (1982-1983)30 Journal of the Copyright
Society of the USA 421-432, at pp. 427-428. Mr. Ladd was the Registerof Copyrights of the United States
from 1980 urtil1985.
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2.1.4. Human Rights Analysis
A human rights analysis would lead one to the same conclusion of a need for
balance. As Ren6 Cassin noted, "human beings can claim rights by the fact of
their creation." 43 Article 27 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(UDHR), 44 which saw the light of day 238 years after the Statute of Anne, protects
both the authors' right to the protection of their moral and material interests
resulting from scientific, literary or artistic production and users' rights freely to
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits. The objective of protection embraces, at
least indirectly, the moral desert theory (protection of interests resulting from
scientific, literary or artistic production), while the objective of access is expressed
teleologically as a tool to allow everyone to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.
A human rights approach brings values to the copyright system. For
example, the emphasis on a somewhat amorphous right to promote culture and
cultural diversity complements the economic analysis and theory as a policymaking machine. As Professor Julie Cohen suggests, copyright needs a
substantive balance, which
concerns the ways in which copyright's goal of creating economic fixity must
accommodate its mission to foster cultural play. Economic analysis can help
us to understand some of the considerations relevant to the balance between
economic fixity and cultural mobility, but both valuation and incommensurability
problems prevent a comprehensive summing of the relevant costs and

4
benefits. Modeling the benefits of artistic and intellectual flux is hard to do.

Copyright's "mission to foster cultural play" may then be read against
the backdrop of articles 27(1) of the UDHR and 15 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 46 which enshrine the right to participate
in cultural life. "Cultural Life must be regarded as a benefit to which every
member of the community is entitled. Culture must not be viewed as an esoteric
47
activity of a superior social elite."
From copyright's viewpoint, culture is a two-way street: it provides the
essential substratum upon which all creators draw to create, and their creations
in turn feed and expand the culture. The phenomenon has taken on an additional
layer of complexity with the globalization of Web culture, but a lot of cultural
resonance remains local. "Individual creators begin with situatedness and work
48
through culture to arrive at the unexpected."
43.

Quoted in M Vivant, "Authors' Rights, Human Rights?", (1997) 174 Revue internationaledu droit d'auteur

44.

(RIDA) 60 at p. 86.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948), UN, General Assembly Resolution 217A (111),

<http://www.ur.org/Overview/rights.html>,(1948) United Nations Doc. A/810 art. 27 at p. 71.

46.

Julie Cohenr, "Creativity and Culture ir Copyright Theory," (2007) 40:3 University of California Davis Law
Review 1151-1205, <http://ssrn.com/abstract-929527>at p. 1196.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, (16 December 1966) UN, General
Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/meru3/b/a-cescr.htm>,993 United Nations
Treaty Series 4 (entry irto force 3 January 1976) art. 15.

47.

Yoram Dinsteir, "Cultural Rights," (1979) 9 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 58-81, at p. 76.

48.

Cohen, "Creativity ard Culture" supra rote 45 at p. 1183.

45.
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Copyright and culture both need new works to be created, though for
different reasons (the former to justify its existence, the latter to grow), and to
be created those new works need existing works. Conceptually, this can be
framed as a "freedom to create," which, to a certain extent at least, is the
freedom to copy. Whether copying constitutes copyright infringement is a
question of degree. Professor Franqois Dessemontet has suggested a list of
factors to be taken into account: (a) whether the work copied from fades away in
the new work; (b) whether the first work is recognizable and the degree to which
it is; and (c) the proportionality of "newness" (presumably assessed quantitatively
49
but also, and perhaps mostly, qualitatively) to the amount that is borrowed.
Human rights arguably restore a degree of authorial dignity to copyright.
"[H]uman beings have fundamental interests, which should not be sacrificed for
public benefit, and [...] society's well-being does not override those interests.
Protecting those interests is deemed vital for maintaining individual autonomy,
independence, and security. '"50 Human rights, in providing a teleological
framework for exceptions, can also guide courts51 in interpreting whether a
particular use should be covered by an unclear exception, and assist policy
makers in designing new exceptions. One might think this impossible, owing to
the presence of the three-step test "straitjacket." However, the third step of the
test, as discussed below, has been interpreted as allowing public interest
considerations (i.e. what constitutes an allowable "justification" for the exception),
and human rights principles might thus inform the determination of the proper
scope of exceptions. The UDHR, in particular, allows exceptionsthat demonstrably
augment access, where such access (enjoyment) is not commercially reasonable
or possible, and the right to reuse and thereby participate in the cultural life of
the community. This seems to justify both consumptive use exceptions where
commercial access is undesirable or impracticable, such as those in the Appendix
to the Berne Convention for access in developing countries, and exceptions for
transformative uses (such as, but not limited to, parody), the principal element of
52
the United States fair use doctrine.
If, then, copyright intrinsically must be balanced, how should this balance
be achieved? Before answering this question, one must recognize that copyright
is facing a number of extrinsic pressures that should ideally result in new equilibria
being progressively established. Copyright's sparring with free expression is not
recent.53 Nor is the well-established need to limit copyright when the public's
"right to information" is involved, as the Berne Convention recognizes in a
49.

Francois Dessemortet, "Copyright and Human Rights," in Jan Kabel, ed., Intellectual Property and

Information Law: Essays in Honour of Herman Cohen Jehoram (Kluwer, 1998) 113-120, <http://www.unil.ch/
50.

51.
52.

53.

webdav/site/cedidac/sha red/Articles/Copyright%20&%o20 uma n%20Rights.pdf>.
Orit Fischman Afori, "Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law Considerations into
American Copyright Law," (2003-2004) 14:2 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law
Journal497-565, <http://ssrr.com/abstract- 089376> at p. 503.
As was done, e.g., by French courts. See Edelman, Note, (1989) 116:4 Journaldu Droit International 1005;
Pierre Sirinelli, Note, (1989) 142 Revue Internationale du Droit dAuteur 301-324.
Except, arguably, between Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc. (USA SC, 1984), <http://
supreme.justia.com/us/464/417/case.html>,464 United States Reports 417, and Metro Goldwyn Mayer
Studios Inc. v Grokster,Ltd. (USA SC, 2005), <http://supreme.justia.com/us/545/04-480/case.html>,
125
Supreme Court Reporter 2764. Sonywas interpreted (wrongly in my view) as deciding that private uses were
fair uses. I read Sony as teaching that some forms of time shiftirg copying may be fair use. In Grokster, the
US Supreme Court went back to traditional fair use jurisprudence and focused o transformative-nrot
purely corsumptive-uses.
Birnhack, "Global Copyright," supra note 27; Netanel, Copyright's Paradox, supra note 27.
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number of ways.14 But copyright must now face other rights. It is not or no longer
viewed as a closed system with built-in exceptions such as fair use or fair dealing
sufficient to ensure the right balance (at least not completely). To mention but two
examples, copyright enforcement vis-h-vis end-users (for example, to obtain a
subscriber's identity from an Internet Service Provider) requires a normative battle
with the right to privacy;"5 and TPMs limiting use and enjoyment of consumer
goods may involve violation of consumer protection legislation (for example, if
the restriction is insufficiently explained at the time of sale).
A principled approach to the determination of limitations and exceptions
must factor in the need for balance against the backdrop of the principles and
values that inform the intrinsic public interest balance of copyright, its utilitarian/
economic function, and the recognition of the extrinsic factors that affect the
realm of copyright.
2.2. Copyright in the Private Sphere

At the international level, but also in many national laws, limitations and
exceptions appear as an incrementally developed patchwork of historical
accretions, a patchwork woven reactively or in response to poorly defined special
interests or practical constraints (such as ephemeral recording). Some exceptions
may indeed have a solid normative footing, but not a uniform one. Private use
(which will be discussed separately in this section) provides a good example of
this for many reasons: its multifaceted normative core (human right 6 and/or
constitutional rights, 7 consumer protection, and as an inherent limit to the reach
of copyright)," its history in both Anglo-Saxon copyright and authors' rights
traditions, and its applicability to the internet.
54.
5.

Birnhack, "Global Copyright," supra note 27; Netanel, Copyright's Paradox, supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
See Pamela Samuelson, "Privacy as Intellectual Property?," (2000) 52:5 Stanford Law Review 1125-1173,
<http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers.html> at p. 1128:
While utilitarian corsiderations weigh heavily in the minds of many Americans who have written

56.

57.

on information privacy issues, noneconomic considerations provide an equally or more
compelling rationale for legal protection for personal data i cyberspace, according to other
commetators. [For t]hose who conceive ofpersonal data protection as a fundamental civilliberty
interest, essential to individual autonomy, dignity, and freedom in a democratic civil society,
information privacy legislation is ofter viewed as recessary to ensure protectior of this interest.
EC, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950),
<http:// convertiors.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm>, ETS No. 155, art. 8; InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966), UN, General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), <http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a ccpr.htm>, 999 United Nations Treaty Series 187 (entry into force 23 March
1976) arts. 17 and 19.
For example in the United States, see Julie E Cohen, "A Right to Read Aronymously: A Closer Look at
Copyright Managemet in Cyberspace," (1996) 28:4 Connecticut Law Review 981-1039, <http://ssrr.com/
abstract-17990>; Julie E. Cohen, "DRM & Privacy," (2003) 18:2 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 575 617,
<http://ssrn.com/abstract-372741 >. In "DRM &Privacy," Professor Cohen states at pp. 576-577:
Properly understood, an individual's interest in intellectual privacy has both spatial and
informational aspects. At its core, this interest concerns the extent of "breathing space," both
metaphorical and physical, available for intellectual activity. DRM technologies may threaten
breathing space by collecting information about intellectual consumption (and therefore

exploration) or by imposing direct constrairts or these activities.
Furthermore, she argues that there may be harm in allowing individuals to waive or sell usage data (via a
DRM system) if it amounts to waiving their intellectual privacy, "DRM & Privacy," at o.

58.

60

9.

See Alain Strowel, "Droit d'auteur et accs a I'information: de quelques malentendus et vrais problemes
travers I'histoire et les d6veloppemerts r6certs," (1999) 12:1 Les Cahiers de proprite intellectuelle 185
208, at p. 198, where Professor Strowel considers the defence ofthe private sphere as ore of the three main
justifications for exceptions to copyright, the other two being circulation of information, and cultural and
scientific development.
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To make matters more complex still, the issue has taken on a different
hue on the internet. Historically, copyright was a tool designed to support
contractual relations between professionals (authors, publishers, producers,
broadcasters, etc.) or to fight professional pirates. It has now become a tool that
rightsholders use against end-users, including consumers.59 This use has a dual
purpose: ensuring that end-users pay a fee for the material they use (access
through authorized sources), and preventing the transfer of the material by
those "end"-users to other users (in other words, preventing them from
becoming intermediaries).
On the other side of this legal and technological tug-of-war, individual
users want to harness the enormous capabilities of the internet to access, use,
and disseminate information and content. The demand is large and ever
increasing. 6 Internet technology has responded to this huge pull by providing
the initial adequate technological means. It has also responded to legal and
technological barriers by providing new tools: close Napster and peer-to-peer
(P2P)6 1 emerges. Try to shut P2P down, as was done in the recent wave of
subpoenas and law suits against individual file traders and, quite predictably,
anonymous file trading systems emerge, thus defeating subpoenas served on
62
the ISP to find out the identity of subscribers.
The fact that copyright's power to exclude has not, historically, extended
its reach to individual end-users was never formulated with a high degree of
precision in copyright statutes and even less so in international treaties. It is,
however, a fundamental concept of many national copyright systems, including
59.
60.

See BMG Canada Inc. v John Doe, 2004 FC 488, <http://reports.fja.gc.ca/er/2004/2004fc488/2004fc488.
html>, 2004:3 Federal Court Reports 241 (upheld or different grourds by 2005 FCA 193).
Richard Stallman wrote a perceptive piece ir 1996:
The Ilternet is relevant because it facilitates copyirg and sharing of writings by ordnary readers.
The easier it is to copy and share, the more useful it becomes, and the more copyright as it stands
row becomes a bad deal.
This analysis also explains why it makes sense for the Grateful Dead to insist on copyright for CD
manufacturing but notfor irdividual copyirg. CD production works like the printing press; it is rot
feasible today for ordinary people, even computer owners, to copy a CD irto another CD. Thus
copyright for publishing CDs of music remains painless for music listeners, just as all copyright
was pairless in the age of the printing press. To restrict copying the same music onto a digital
audio tape does hurt the listeres, however, and they are entitled to reject this restriction.
We car also see why the abstractress of irtellectual property is not the crucial factor. Other
forms of abstract property represent shares of something. Copying any kird of share is
intrinsically a zero sum activity; the person who copies benefits only by taking wealth away from
everyore else. Copyirg a dollar bill ir a color copier is effectively equivalert to shaving a small
fraction off of every other dollar ard adding these fractiors together to make one dollar
Naturally, we consider this wrong. By contrast, copying useful, enlightening or entertaining
information for a friend makes the world happier and better off; it benefits the friend and
inherently hurts no ore. It is a corstructive activity that strengthers social bonds.

61.
62.

Richard Stallman, "Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail," (1996) 75:1 Oregon Law Review 291297, <http://www.gru.org/philosophy/reevaluating-copyright.html> at p. 294.
A type of network in which ary computer car act as both a server (by providing access to its resources to
other computers) ard a client (by accessing shared resources from other computers).
The third gereration of P2P software has arorymity features built in. Examples include ANts P2P RShare,
Freenet, 12P,GNUnet ard Entropy. Anonymity tools use a variety of routirg and rerouting techniques. The
user computer never has a direct lirk with the host. Instead, the irformation is relayed over several
intermediate clients ard each client only knows the IP address of its immediate neighbors, but not the IP of
the origiral host. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Anorymous-P2P>. This obviously makes it much
harder for someone to identify who is downloadirg and offerirg files. Combined with strong encryption,
traffic "sriffing" has also become harder. Everyone loses in this scerario because it becomes even more
difficult to know what is happering or P2P retworks. See also BMG Canada Inc. v John Doe, supra rote 59
and, in the Urited States, Recording Industry Association ofAmerica, Inc. v Verizon Internet Services (USA
DC Cir, 2003), <http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opiriors/20031
2/03-701 5a.pdf>, 257 Federal
Supplement 2d 244.
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Belgium 63 and Germany. In Germany, one of the leading scholars on copyright
and patent law, Josef Kohler, argued that one should not focus on the technical
nature of the use, but its impact and intent. 64 This affected several European
national systems. In the words of Professor Hugenholtz,
[Clopyright protects against acts of unauthorized communication, not
consumptive usage [...]. [T]he mere reception or consumption of information
by end-users has traditionally remained outside the scope of the copyright
monopoly. Arguably, the right of privacy and the freedom of reception
guaranteed in Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
would be unduly restricted if the economic right encompassed mere acts of
65
information reception or end use.

This strong tradition to protect the private sphere of uses (i.e. when the
use is truly private and not related to professional or commercial activities) might
explain why Germany was the first country to introduce a statutory license for
private copying in 1965.66 However, in a 1955 case, the German Supreme Court
recognized that the protection of the private sphere was not absolute, especially
if the effects of what was happening inside the sphere had an impact on
67
commercial exploitation outside of it.
This crucial role of private use is also illustrated dialectically in the Swiss
Copyright Act of 1992,68 the development of which was informed doctrinally by
the Germanic approach to authors' rights. The Act contains a very broad right to
prevent use of a copyrighted work in Article 10(1), which reads as follows: "The
author shall have the exclusive right to decide whether, when and how his work
is to be used. ' 69 However, Article 19 provides that "[plublished works may be
'
used for private purposes. "70
Canada's private copying regime, like Germany's, is a middle ground
between the protection of the private sphere of users and the rights of authors,
71
especially in the face of exponential possibilities to make private digital copies.
63.
64.

65.

66.

67.
68.

69.
70.

See Strowel, "Droit d'auteur et accs a I'informatior," supra note 58.
Josef Kohler, Das Autorrecht: eine zivilistische Abhandlung; Zugleich e/n Beitrag zur Lehre vom Eigenthum,
vom Miteigenthum, vom Rechtsgeschaft und vom Indivlbidualrecht(Gustav Fischer, 1880), <http://dl b pr.
mpier.mpg.de/m/kleioc/0010/exec/books/%22160676%o22> at p. 230 [Josef Kohler, Authors Right: A Civil
Law Treatise. Which is also a contribution to the theory of property joint property legal transactionsand
individual rights (Published by Gustav Fischer, 1880)].
P Bernt Hugenholtz, "Cachirg ard Copyright: The Right of Temporary Copying," (2000) 22:10 European Intellectual
Property Review482-493 at pp. 482, 485-486. Early version available at <http://www.ivir.nl/publicatiors/hugerholtz/
PBH DIPPER.doc >.See also JH Spoor, Scripta manent(Amsterdam, 1976), at pp. 137 138.
See Katerina Gaita ard Andrew Christie, "Principles or Compromise: Understarding the Original Thinkirg
Behind Statutory License and Levy Schemes for Private Copyirg," 2004:4 Intellectual Property Quarterly
422 447, <http://www.ipria.org/publicatiors/workingpapers/IPRIA%20WP
2004.04.pdf>.
GEMA v Grundig, Burdesgerichtshof [BGH] (Germar Federal Supreme Court, 18 May 1955), 1955
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 492 (492) (FR.G).
Switzerland, Federal Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Federal Copyright Law) (9 October 1992),
<http://www.wipo.irt/clea/docs new/er/ch/ch004er.html>, (1993) Recueil Officiel 1798 [English translation
by WI PO].
Switzerland, Federal Copyright Law, supra rote 68. This broad "use right" is explicated usirg traditioral
termirology (reproduction, communicatior, etc.) in art. 19(2).
Switzerland, Federal Copyright Law, supra rote 68. The exception is extended to copies for the user

manufactured by persors other thar the user and libraries that make copyirg apparatus available to their
users. However, the exception does not apply to computer programs (arts. 19(2) and (3)).

71.

Ardrew Christie, "Private Copyirg and Levy Schemes: Resolvirg the Paradox of Civiliar and Common Law
Approaches," ir David Vaver and Lonel Bently eds. Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Essays in
Honour of William R. Cornish (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 248-258, <http://ssrn.com/
abstract-690521>.
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Against this backdrop, can the principle of "free" private use be
exported tel quel to the internet? It was not an obvious step for copyright on the
internet to try to reach end-users who do not consider themselves to be pirates
and who do not act with the intent of commercial gain. But as the Ninth Circuit
noted in Napster,72 accessing a commercial copy for free, even if for use in the
private sphere, may be analogized to a commercial use, if the copy should
ordinarily have been purchased. 73 Put another way, if the main purpose of the
private use is to avoid "paying the customary price," 74 then the nature of private
use has indeed changed.
In fact, this is exactly what has changed: private use may now be seen
as a means of access to a commercial product, whereas its original purpose was
to allow use in private and/or for personal purposes after access. This may be
where the conceptual jump requires what Andr6 Lucas referred to as the need
for a new balance, one that requires private use to be distinguished from
"private access." 71 At the level of principles, use of a copy once it has entered
into and stays in the private sphere is one thing, and there are good normative
reasons why it should remain free, in particular copyright's balance against the
right of privacy, whether as a constitutional right on the national level or as a
principle of international human rights law. But private use applied to access to
copies designed to circumvent commercial distribution channels is a different
issue. There may be other reasons not to sue individual consumers, and the fact
that the P2P phenomenon has thus far proven impossible to stop, and that there
are good reasons to think it will continue that way, may well be a reason to shift
the thinking towards the establishment of a liability regime.76 However, this type
of access is not "private use," as the term has been used historically.
As Professor Paul Goldstein has noted, the fact that "performances of
literary and artistic works migrate from public places-in which authors are
compensated-to private places-in which they are not-[and hence] the failure
to compensate for private use can seriously undermine the economics of
authorship." 77 If that is the case, it may well be that the changes brought about
by the internet require, once the three-step test is factored into the equation, the
establishment of a compensation mechanism. However, at the level of principles,
the private use sphere should remain free of the reach of the exclusive right to
prohibit. This would be subject to TPMs, but the imposition of an obligation to
remove TPMs in order to empower the private use is a valid policy consideration,
and the principles proposed below include a provision to that effect, subject to
a proportionality test.

72.
73.
74.

A&M Records, Inc. v Napster Inc., (USA 911Cir, 2001), <http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopirions.nsf/89AEI3
D39D4D4BAA88256B8700619C17/$file/0115998.pdf?operelemert>,239 Federal Reporter 3d 1004 [Napster].
See Napster,supra note 72 and Jane C Ginsburg, "Copyright Use and Excuse or the Internet," (2000) 24
Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts 1-45 < http://ssrn.com/abstract-239747>.
See Harper & Row, Inc. v Nation Enterprises (USA Sup Ct, 1985), <http://supreme.justia.com/us/471/539/

case.html>, 471 US 539, 562.

76.

Andre Lucas, "Summary of the Proceedings of the Symposium," in WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Future
of Copyrightand Neighboring Rights, WIPO Publication No. 731 (Gereva: WIP0, 1994), at pp. 276-277.
See Gervais, "The Price of Social Norms," supra note 30.

77.

Paul Goldsteir, "Copyright and Authors' Rights in the Twerty-First Certury," in WIPO Worldwide

75.

Symposium on the Future of Copyright and Neighboring Rights, supra rote 75 at p. 264.
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2.3. Towards Principles for Limitations and Exceptions
What the above analysis suggests is that a proper design of limitations and
exceptions must be better conceptualized and informed both by the need to
maintain the intrinsic balance of copyright-a balance that may have been
overlooked, at least normatively, in some of the revisions of the Berne
Convention-and by the need to ensure copyright's compatibility with external
norms, such as privacy, the right to free expression, information, culture,
education and the more controversial right to development. 8 It is not possible
to examine each of these rights in detail, but as the purpose of this article is to
contribute to the development of a principled conceptualization for copyright
limitations and exceptions at the international level, it will be assumed that these
norms form part of the international legal order. As the Appellate Body of the
World Trade Organization recognizes, these rights are indeed directly relevant in
79
interpreting WTO Agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement.
2.3.1. A Conceptualization of Limitations and Exceptions
Any conceptualization must recognize that limitations and exceptions fulfill multiple
purposes and functions. As a result, they are expressed in a variety of ways, which
makes comparison and understanding more challenging. I suggest, however, that
they can be organized according to the following categorization: whether they
apply to some categories of users; whether they apply to some categories of use;
whether they apply to some categories of countries; whether they apply to some
categories of authors; and finally, whether they apply to some categories of works.
A tabular illustration illuminates this approach more clearly.

78.

79.

Ruth Okediji, "The Limits of Developmert Strategies at the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Human
Rights," ir Daniel Gervais, ed., Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize
Economic Development in a TRIPS Plus Era (Oxford University Press, 2007) 355 384; ard Robert J Gutowski,
"The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows
or a Match Made in Heaven?" (1999) 47 Buffalo Law Review 713-761 at pp. 713, 715.
The WTO Appellate Body fourdta the WTO Agreemert "is not to be read ir cinical isolation from public
international law." United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (19 April 1996)
WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), <http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN highLightParent.asp?q
u-&doc-D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F2ABR%2EWPF%2EHTM> at para. 3, part B.
This principle was reflected ir this and subsequent decisions, which however relied, at a very general level
only, on the case law of other international tribunals, namely the International Court of Justice, the European
Court of Human Rights cases and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, to interpret the provisions of the
WTO Agreement. See Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, (4 October 1996) WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R

(Appellate Body Report), <http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN hihLightParent.asp?qu-&doc-D
OCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F8ABR%2EWPF%2EHTM>

at part D, footrote 19.
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Table 2. Possible Principles for a Conceptualization of Limitations and Exceptions
CATEGORIZATION

CATEGORIES

INTERNAL BALANCE

EXTERNAL NORMS

By type of user

Limited ability users

Braille copies

Non-discrimination

Consumers

Private sphere/
difficult enforcement

Privacy, consumer
protection

By type of use

Government

Education, culture,
information (national
security)

Institutional

Education, culture,
information
Reuse by quotation

Information, free expression

Consumptive

Private sphere/
difficult enforcement

Privacy, consumer
protection, education,
information, culture

Creative/transformative

Limit right to prohibit
when beyond need;
public interest balance

Free expression, culture,
information

Informational

Public interest balance

Information, free expression

By type of country

Developing country

By type of author

Governmental works

No incentive needed

Information

By type of work

Computer software

Public interest function
does not require prohibition
of reverse engineering"

Competition

Printed publications

Access does not interfere
with copyright's function

Education, information

Right to development;
education

It should also be pointed out at this juncture that international norms
concerning limitations and exceptions can be categorized by their legal nature.
Some are mandatory (for example, the quotation right in the Berne Convention);
others are declaratory in nature and designed to signal the compatibility of
certain limitations and exceptions with the international legal order. This,
however, is not directly relevant in examining the underlying principles, though
it becomes relevant when implementing the principle.
Before proceeding from the above conceptualization systematically, the
reader no doubt has noticed that the categorization not found above is by type
of right. Downstream, such a categorization would be useless because (a) many
uses do not involve a single right, but rather several (for example, uploading
material to the internet may involve the right of reproduction, the right of public
performance/communication, the right of display, where applicable, and the
right of adaptation);82 (b) now that copyright is increasingly applied to end-users,
it has become even more illusory to expect that individual consumers can parse
which right or sub-right fragment they may need. Upstream, I suggest that it is
an unprincipled approach to make an exception dependent on the technical
nature of the right. Put differently, as a matter of principle the legislator should
not grant a limitation or exception because it is, for example, the right of
reproduction that is involved rather than the right of adaptation, but should do
80.

For example, libraries, museums, archives and educatioral institutions.

81.

See Par Samuelson and Suzanre Scotchmer, "The Law & Ecoromics of Reverse Ergineerirg" (2002) 111
The Yale Law Journal 1575-1663, <http://yalelawjourral.org/images/pdfs/200.pdf>.

82.

Ever if only ore right is rivolved (e.g. reproduction), that right itself may have been fragmented
contractually by, for example, the type of market, user, language, or country.
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so because of the underlying public interest (both as a matter of internal
copyright balance and to reflect external normative forces and the search for
new equilibria). This means that limitations and exceptions should be expressed
in terms that are independent of the technical nature of the use (reproduction,
communication, performance, etc.) unless this is contextually required. For
instance, use in the private sphere (whether expressed as private performance,
private copying, or teleologically as, say, private study) should not be subject to
exclusive copyright rights.
This approach is fully supported by the three-step test, which is the filter
through which limitations and exceptions must pass to be or remain TRIPScompatible. The test, as we will see in the next section, is effects-based and
independent of the technical mode of use (i.e., not linked to the rights
fragment(s) that may be affected by the limitation or exception).
2.3.2. Proposed Principles
As I have just argued, limitations and exceptions should be expressed in terms of
their effects in order to allow policy makers to align limitations and exceptions with
underlying objectives. However, because rights are still dominantly expressed in
terms of technical acts such as reproduction, performance, or communication
(though contracts rarely do: a right to use a film for broadcasting is probably
unlikely to specify how many acts of reproduction, communication, etc., can be
done; it will authorize the "broadcasting" of a work for a period of time and in or
to a specific market), it may still be necessary when drafting national laws to express
them in such terms. Even then, a paradigmatic shift in the expression of limitations
and exceptions (a) may be better to achieve the policy alignment; and (b) would
provide courts with an enhanced toolbox to ensure proper application in each case.
It is not possible in this paper to provide a complete set of exceptions,
but international rules should allow exceptions and limitations in the cases
identified in Table 2. The underlying principles, if they can be grouped at a
higher level of abstraction, probably would look like this:
a) Copyright rights should not prohibit use inthe private sphere of users; 3
b) Copyright rights should not prohibit access in countries or to groups of
users who have otherwise no reasonable means of access to copyright
content;

84

c) Copyright rights should not prevent educational uses that cannot be
reasonably licensed;8"

83.

84.
85.

Ifa reed for enforcement arises, it will bebecaus e
user has stepped out of her private sphere and her
actions have reached a level where a commercial impact is perceptible. From an effects-based perspective,
it should rot matter which type of cortent is used or whether the issue is space, time, or format-shifting, if
there is no sigrificant market ir selling ("sellirg" is used here generically, ard rot to refer to copyirg,
performirg, etc.) additioral copieswn r ompared to the burden or the consumer.
This would irclude educators in less economically developed areas.
From an effects-based perpective, it should not much matter whether the teachig is done "or the premises" or
at a distarce. As a public interest matter, it may, howeverart
hr or rot t
eachirg is poe for proft.
"Reasorably licensed" in this context refers to the availability of a transactior at a price and with corditions
includirg transactior costs that oe would consider ordinary in light of market practices. The concept of "accepted
market practices" in competition (antitrust) law might be a useful refererce.
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d) Copyright rights should not prohibit access by institutions whose
purpose is to document and preserve cultural assets;8"
e) Copyright rights should not prevent uses and reuses that serve the
public interest in free expression, including the creation and
dissemination of culture and information. This includes quotation,
parody, and other similar "transformative" uses.87 It also includes
research,88 and criticism and review (subject to (i) below);
f) Courts should have the latitude not to apply exclusive rights when they
interfere unreasonably with the right of information or the rights of a
free press; 9
g) Copyright rights should not prevent governmental use in the public
interest (though generally with compensation). Internal and commercial
uses by the government would, however, remain subject to exclusive
rights;
h) Copyright rights should not prevent access and (at least non-commercial)
use of governmental publications of a general nature; 90

i) All limitations and exceptions, except arguably with respect to (e) above,
may be limited to uses that will not demonstrably affect the normal
commercial exploitation and to non-commercial uses;

j)

In cases where the public interest justifies the exception but it will cause
a loss of income, a compensation mechanism should be in place.

In terms of enforcement and procedure, most exceptions do not require
specific mechanisms, and no new international norms seem necessary in this
area. Users usually invoke limitations and exceptions as defenses to infringement
actions. Where available, declaratory rulings may also be used. Logically, uses
covered by an exception should not be "circumvented" by TPMs. This requires
a governmental mechanism (courts or a specialized agency or tribunal 1 ) to order
that a TPM be removed in whole or in part in cases where the use permitted by
the exception or limitation is not possible. The competent authority should,
however, be allowed to refuse the remedy and perhaps offer compensation
instead (for example, in cases where unlocking the TPM is liable to cause harm
86.
87.

88.
89.

90.

Based on the three-step test, the focus should not be on considerations such as whether one or two copies
are made, in which format, and whether they are permanent or rot, but rather or modes of public access to
those copies that may interfere with normal commercial exploitatior.
In the wording of the initial versions of the Berne Convention, ramely works that "present the character of a
new original work." Thsis a good start for an international defirition of what is a "transformative" (as opposed
to a mere derivative) work. However, "trarsformative" should probably be measured using a more complex test
of societal value and the impact of the commercial exploitation or the work from which it is derived.
As a result of the applicat o of the three step test, "research" could include some commurication among a
research team but not public dissemination of results usirg copyrighted material belonging to third parties.
This right, perhaps the most fourdational of democratic systems and the most potertially transformative in
fledgling democracies, should be of paramount importance, though the commercial nature of the media
should rot be completely ignored. This equilibrium is reflected by th
e of the term "reasorably" and the
inherent content of the right of irformation.
"Of a general nature" ir this context means publications rot specifically destined for a market corstituted
mairly by users who benefit from the exception.

91.

For example, the "Autorit6 de regulation des mesures techriques," established urder art. L.331-17 of the
French Intellectual Property Code, as amended by the Loi n 2006 961 du ler ao0t 2006 relative au droit
d'auteur et aux drbits voisins dans la societe de I'information,(3 August 2006) ro. 178 Jou rnal officiel de la
Republique Fraraise p. 11529. <http://www.legifrarce.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte-JORFTEXT00000026
6350&dateTexte->.
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to the rightsholder and this harm outweighs the user's interest in unlocking a
particular work for a given purpose). However, enforcement is also linked to
statutory damages. The application of this type of damages, while it is necessary
in commercial piracy cases to ensure deterrence, should not interfere with bona
fide recourse to exceptions developed under the above set of principles.
Some limitations and exceptions in national and regional legislation are
worded in terms that mirror some of the above principles fairly closely (for
example, private use). Clearly, however, a number of existing limitations and
exceptions may serve multiple purposes. For example, reverse engineering of
computer programs is necessary to allow research and to perform certain private
uses. This follows from the fact that exceptions are expressed in terms of the
technical act (for example, decompilation/reverse engineering) and not their
purpose. Such exceptions need not be changed, though their interpretation and
application in a particular case should be informed by the underlying purpose
they are designed to achieve.

3. THE THREE-STEP TEST

3.1. Historical Background
general rule
known as the "three-step test" was added to the Berne Convention to limit
exceptions to the right of reproduction-a right which was added to the
Convention at the same Revision Conference. According to the Study Group set
up by BIRP192 (the predecessor of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WI PO))91and the Swedish government to prepare the Conference, because the
right of reproduction was added to the Convention, a "satisfactory formula
would have to be found for the inevitable exceptions to that right." 94 The Group
noted that,
AT THE 1967 STOCKHOLM BERNE CONVENTION REVISION CONFERENCE, a

while it was obvious that all forms of exploiting a work which had, or were
likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical importance must in

principle be reserved to the authors [...]
it should not be forgotten that
domestic laws already contained a series of exceptions in favour of various

public and cultural interests and [...]
it would be vain to suppose that
countries would be ready at this stage to abolish these exceptions to any
appreciable extent."

The Group also recommended that exceptions should be "made for
clearly specified purposes" 96 and, using language that is not dissimilar to the
92.

Bureaux Internationaux Reunis pour laProtection de laPropri&er

Intellectuelle (United International Bureaux

forthe Protectionof Intellectual
Property).

93.
94.
95.
96.

See <www.wipo rt>.
Ouoted in Mihaly Ficsor,
The Law of Copyright and the Internet (Oxford University
Press, 2002), at s.5.51.
Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June II toJuly 14, 1967 (Gereva: WIPO,
1971),
atp. 111[Records of the Stockholm Conference].
Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 95 at p.112.
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traditional US fair use jurisprudence (discussed below), added that a limitation on
the exclusive right of the author "should not enter into economic competition
with" protected works.9 7 These considerations would inform the work of the
Conference and the interpretation of the test.
The work of the Study Group was handed over at the Conference to a
Working Group whose mandate was to try to operationalize the findings of the
Study Group in the text of the Convention. At the outset, the Working Group
proposed a text that would have allowed exceptions (a) for private use; (b) for
judicial or administrative purposes; and (c)"in certain particular cases where the
reproduction is not contrary to the legitimate interests of the author and does
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work." 98 The debates at the
Conference initially focused on the merits of adding a list of well delineated
exceptions (which included (a) and (b), but not (c), above). Instead, because the
outcome of the debate was taking the form of a shopping list, the Conference
opted to follow a British proposal to take out (a) and (b) entirely and to replace
them with a general provision along the lines of (c).99
The Conference also provided guidance on the interpretation of the
test, and indicated that the first logical step (the Conference did not consider the
"special case" requirement to be a separate step, a view with which I agree and
to which I will return below) was to determine whether there was a conflict with
normal commercial exploitation. If not, then either a compulsory license or a full
exception could be introduced in national law. The compulsory license (with
remuneration) would then counterbalance the level of prejudice in the last step,
i.e. it would render such prejudice reasonable where this was necessary.10
The test adopted at the 1967 Convention was thus intended to guide
national legislators as to the proper scope of exceptions to the right of
reproduction.1 °1
3.2. Interpretation
The test contained in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention allows exceptions to
the right of reproduction
*

in certain special cases;

*

that do not conflict with the normal commercial exploitation of the work; and

*

do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.

The test was relatively obscure until 1994. That year, with the adoption

97. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 95.
98. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 95 at p.113.
99. Ficsor,
The Law of Copyright and the Internet, supra rote 94 at s.5.53.
100. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 95 at para. 85 ofthe Report ofMain Committee 1.
101.See Daniel
Gervais, The TRIPs Agreement: Drafting
History And Analysis, 2d ed. (Sweet& Maxwel, 2003), at
pp. 144-147; Mihaly Ficsor,
"How Much ofWhat? The Three-Step Testard its
Application inTwo Rece rWTO
Dispute Settlement Cases," (2002) 192 Revue internationale du droit d'auteur 111 251, atpp. 231 242.
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of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 10 2 it became the cornerstone for almost all
exceptions to all intellectual property rights in international law. It is now used as
the model for exceptions to all copyright rights in TRIPS (article 13), to the rights
created by the WIPO Copyright Treaty1°3 (article 10), and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (article 16). Interestingly, in TRIPS, it is also the basis for
exceptions to industrial design protection (article 26(2)), and patent rights (article
30). There is, however, a crucial difference in the case of patent rights, which may
impact how the rule is interpreted when applied to copyright: the last (third) step
of the test in article 30 requires that exceptions not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, "taking account of the legitimate interests
104
of third parties."
3.2.1. "Certain Special Cases"
There are two ways to interpret this first step. The first finds its origin in the
history of the Berne Convention. In the first edition of his seminal book on the
Berne Convention,10 Professor Sam Ricketson opined that "special" meant that
the exception must have a purpose and be justified by public policy.10 6 This
purpose-oriented (or "teleological") interpretation of the Convention is seemingly
reinforced by the use of the phrase "to the extent justified by the purpose" in
articles 10(1) and 10(2) of the Convention (which allow exceptions to be made
for quotation and teaching), and article 10bis(2) (which allows reporting of
current events). 10 7 Public information (or the public's right to know) 108 is clearly
the policy basis for the latter exception and for the possible exclusion from
copyright of certain official texts.
The 2000 WTO panel decision concerning section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act1 °9 adopted a different approach to interpret the first part of the
three-step test, namely the meaning of "special." This was the first time it was
interpreted by an international tribunal. The panel was aware of Ricketson's

102. TRIPS Agreemert, supra oteS . The TRIPS Agreemert also contairs a list of material excluded for
copyrightability (art. 9(2)), namely "ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as
such." Article 13 also extends the three-step test of the Berne Convention to cover ary copyright right
(includirg, e.g. public performarce).
103. This treaty was implemented ir the Urited States by the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. ro. 105-

304, 112 Statutes at Large 2860, s. 10 ard preamble, <http://www.copyright.gov/legislatior/dmca.pdf>. The
WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998 is title I of the
DMCA. The treaty has at least two interestirg features fo r opurposes, ramely the application of the
three-step test in its art. 10 ard the following declaratior in its Preamble: "Recognizing the reed to
mairtain a balarce between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly educatior,
research and access to irformation, as reflected ir the Berne Convention."

104. TRIPS Agreemert, supra rote 5, art. 30 (emphasis added). I am indebted to Dr. Mihly Ficsor, who shared
his views or the WTO panel decisior dealing with s. 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, infra note 109).
105. Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886-1986 (Sweet &

Maxwell, 1987).
106.

Ricketson, The Berne Convention, supra note 105 at p. 482. A different approach is presented in the new
edition of his commertary, coauthored with Professor Girsburg. See Sam Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg,
International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (Oxford University
Press, 2006), vol. 1, at ss. 13.10-13.12.
107. Berne Convention, supra rote 4 at art. 10.
108. As embodied ir part ir s. 2(b) of the CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms, <http://aws.justice.gc.ca/
en/charter/>.
109. United States Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, (15 June 2000) WTO Doc. WT/DS1 60/R NVTO
Dispute Settlement Parel Report), <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/1234da.pdf> [United
States Section 110(5) Panel Report].
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view 110 but opted to look at the Oxford Dictionary:"11
The term "special" connotes "having an individual or limited application or
purpose", "containing details; precise, specific", "exceptional in quality or
degree; unusual; out of the ordinary" or "distinctive in some way". This term
means that more is needed than a clear definition in order to meet the
standard of the first condition. In addition, an exception or limitation must be
limited in its field of application or exceptional in its scope. In other words,
an exception or limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a
qualitative sense.112

The approach chosen by the panel is understandable. For valid
normative reasons," 3 in previous decisions the WTO Appellate Body preferred
to adhere to the ordinary meaning of words, notably to avoid introducing
"unbargained for" concessions in the WTO legal framework. 114 This approach is
arguably compatible with the Stockholm Study Group, which had requested that
any exception to the right of reproduction be "for clearly specified purposes."
The "dictionary approach" has been criticized as a form of textualism
rather than contextualism, that is, an incomplete and result-oriented approach
and not necessarily the best way to identify the "ordinary meaning." 5 However,
it seems that, with the WTO as arbiter of international intellectual property
disputes concerning both the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention (as
incorporated into TRIPS), the "dictionary approach," which sees the first step as
requiring some clear definition of the contours of an exception, is here to stay.
That being said, the other view, namely that there is (also) a normative element
to the first step and that it requires the demonstration of the existence of a valid
public policy, is compatible with the analysis of both panels, especially the
116
Canada Pharmaceuticals panel report.
It is worth noting also that, at the 1967 Stockholm Conference, this first
step was really a last filter:
If it is considered that reproduction1 17 conflicts with the normal exploitation of
the work, reproduction is not permitted at all. If it is considered that
110. United States-Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 109 atrote 114.
111.United States Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 109 atparas. 6.108 6.110.
112. United States-Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 109 atpara. 6.109 (emphasis added, omittirg
footrote inthe origiral
tothe Oxford Dictionary).
113. Essentially, that
trade agreements are bargained forand should rot, therefore, be "completed" or
amerded by interpretation.
See e.g., United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, supra rote 79, inwhich the Appellate Body stated that"applying the basic
prirciple
of
interpretation that
the words ofa treaty, like
the General Agreement, areto be given their
ordirary mearing,
intheir
cortext and irthe light
ofthe treaty's object and purpose."
114. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, supra rote 101, ato.146.
115. Dongsheng Zang, "Textualism Ir GATT /TO Jurispruderce: Lessons For The Corstitutionalization
Debate," (2006) 33 Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 393-444, at pp. 428-434.
116. Ina second parel report
dealing witharticle
30 (arother instantiation
ofthe test)
dealing withlimitations
cortained in the Canadiar Patent Act, the first step was interpreted
as mearrg "limited" (such as, for
patents, limitedto an area of technology). Those interpretatiors
are more likely
to guide futureWTO panels

called upor toapply the three-step test.
See Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products case,
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/7428d.pdf>, (2000) WTO Doc.WT/DS1 14/R. Ar exceptior
must thus be limited
to a reasonably narrow use orcategory ofusers.
117. Thisquote relates
to the three-step test
cortained inart. 9(2)
ofthe Berne Convention, where itonlyapplies
to the right
of reproduction. In art.
13 ofTRIPS, itwas extended to all
copyright rights.
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reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, the
next step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author. Only if such is not the case would it be
possible in certain special cases to introduce a compulsory license, or to
provide for use without payment."8

In sum, most purpose-specific, limited exceptions should pass the first
step of the test. One could argue that an exception limited to a class of users is
similarly limited in scope. It is less clear, however, that an open-ended "fair use"
provision would necessarily meet this part of the test.
3.2.2.

Interference with Normal Commercial Exploitation

What is the meaning of "exploitation" in the context of the second step of the
test? It seems fairly straightforward: any use of the work by which the copyright
owner tries to extract or maximize the value of her right.119 "Normal" is more
troublesome. Does it refer to what is simply "common" or does it refer to a
normative standard? The question is relevant in particular for new forms and
emerging business models that have not thus far been common or "normal" in
an empirical sense. As noted above, at the revision of the Berne Convention in
Stockholm in 1967, the concept was used to refer to "all forms of exploiting a
work which [had], or [were] likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical
120
importance."
Professor Paul Goldstein notes that the purpose of the second step is to
"fortify authors' interests in their accustomed markets against local legislative
inroads." 121 It thus seems that the condition is normative in nature: an exception
is not allowed if it covers any form of exploitation which has, or is likely to
acquire, considerable importance. In other words, if the exception is used to limit
a commercially significant market or, a fortiori, to enter into competition with the
122
copyright holder, the exception is prohibited.
Professor Mih~ly Ficsor and the WTO panel on the US section 110(5)
case agreed with this approach. The WTO panel concluded as follows:
[I]t appears that one way of measuring the normative connotation of normal
exploitation is to consider, in addition to those forms of exploitation that
currently generate significant or tangible revenue, those forms of exploitation
which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire
123
considerable economic or practical importance.
118. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 95 at p. 1145
119. Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, supra rote 94 at s. 5.56.
120. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 95 at p. 112.

121.

Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (Oxford Uriversity Press, 1998) at p. 295.

See also Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, supra note 94 at p. 516.
122. Ore could see the scope of ar exception based onr ro-commercially sigrificant use in the Databaseand
Collections ofInformation Misappropriation Act (USA 2003), Bill H.R. 3261, 10811Congress, <http://thomas.
Ioc.gov/cgi-bir/query/z?c108:H.R.3261 .IH:> at s. 4(b) which would allow: the makirg available in commerce
of a substantial part of a database by a ronprofit educational, scientific, and research institution, includirg
an employee or agert of such institution acting within the scope of such employmert or agency, for
rorprofit educational, scientific, and research purposes [... if the court determines that the making
available in commerce of the information in the database is reasonable under the circumstarces, takirg irto
corsideration the customary practices associated with such uses of such database by nonprofit educational,
scientific, or research irstitutions and other factors that the court determines relevant.
123. United States-Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra rote 109 at para. 6.180.
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The impact of the second step on specific exceptions is discussed below.
3.2.3. Unreasonable Prejudice to Legitimate Interests of Rightsholder
The third step is perhaps the most difficult to interpret. What is an "unreasonable
prejudice" and what are "legitimate interests"?
Let us start with the term "legitimate." It could have two meanings: (a)
conformable to, sanctioned or authorized by law or principle; lawful; justifiable;
proper; or (b) normal, regular, conformable to a recognized type, according to the
Oxford English Dictionary. To put it differently, are legitimate interests only "legal
interests"? If a broader view of the interests involved is preferred, the third step
124
would then reflect the need to balance the rights of copyright holders and users.
At the 1967 Stockholm Conference, the United Kingdom took the view
that legitimate meant simply "sanctioned by law," while other countries seemed
to take a broader view of the term as meaning "supported by social norms and
relevant public policies." 125 The WTO panel 126 adjudicating on the US section
110(5) case concluded that the combination of the notion of "prejudice" with
that of "interests" pointed clearly towards what the WTO panel refers to as a
"legal-normative" approach, one with clear positivist overtones. "Legitimate
interests," the panel concluded, are simply those that are protected by law.
This leaves open one key question: what is an "unreasonable"
prejudice?12 7 Clearly, the word "unreasonable" indicates that some level or
degree of prejudice is justified. For example, while a country might exempt
entirely the making of a small number of private copies, it may be required to
impose a compensation scheme, such as a levy, when the prejudice level
becomes unjustified.1 2 8 To buttress this view, the French version of the Berne
Convention, which governs in case of a discrepancy between the linguistic
versions,1 29 uses the expression "ne cause pas un pr6judice injustifi6," which one
would translate literally as "does not cause an unjustified prejudice." The
Convention translators opted instead for "does not unreasonably prejudice." 3 °
124. To the same effect, see Martin Senftleber, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of
the Three Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law (Kluwer, 2004), at pp. 226 227:

125.
126.

[C] opyright law is centred rourd the delicate balance between grants and reservatiors. Or one
side of this balance, the economic and non economic interests of authors of already existng
works car be fourd. Or the other side, the interests of users-a group encompassing authors
wishirg to build upon the work of their predecessors-are located. If a proper balance between
the concerns of authors and users is to be struck, both sides must necessarily take a step towards
the centre. The two elements of the third criterion [legitimate irterests ard unreasonable
prejudice] mirror these two steps. The authors carrot assert each ard every corcer. Irstead,
only legitimate nterests are relevant. As a countermove, the users recognise that copyright
limitatiors in their favour must keep within reasorable limits.
Ficsor, "How Much of What," supra rote 101, at p. 143.
United States Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 109 at paras. 6.223 6.229. At para. 6.224 the panel
somehow tried to reconcilete two approaches:

[Fhe term relates to lawfulness from a legal positivist perspective, but it has also the connotation of
legitimacy from a more normative perspective, in the cortext of callirg forthe protection of interests
that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that urderlie the protection of exclusive rights.
127. It is worth roting that "rot unreasorable prejudice" is not quite the same as "reasonable prejudice." The
Panel noted that
i[notunreasonable' connotes a slightly stricter threshold than 'reasonable'." (United
States-Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra rote 109 at para. 6.225). It seems to assume that prejudice is
unreasorable unless shown otherwise.
128. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 95 at 883.
129. Berne Convention, supra rote 4 at art. 37(1)(c).
130. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 95 at p. 1145, s. 84.
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The inclusion of a justification criterion, which is present in the French version,
would allow legislators to establish a balance between, on the one hand, the
rights of authors and other copyright holders and, on the other, the needs and
interests of users. In other words, there must be a public interest justification to
limit copyright.
Unfortunately, the WTO panel essentially conflated the second and third
steps when it concluded that "prejudice to the legitimate interests of right
holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has
'
the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner."131
A public interest imperative may lead a government to impose an exception to
copyright that may translate into a loss of revenue for copyright holders. To
ensure that the prejudice is not unreasonable, a compensation mechanism must
132
then be established.
3.2.4. Market-Oriented Impacts
The net result of the WTO decisions is that any exception to copyright (i.e.
without compensation to the rightsholders) must be measured against any
demonstrable loss of income for rightsholders. The policy tool that would seem
best to embody this is to situate the exception on an income stream target. At
the centre of the target are core income streams. To translate this in commercial
terms, would the exception significantly limit existing sales or licensing income
or, under the second step, prevent the rightsholder from trying to sell or license
their copyright rights (i.e. the "trial and error" establishment of commercial
exploitation)? Any exception that results in either of these two possibilities is
almost certainly incompatible with the second and probably also the third step
of the test. Exceptions that demonstrably affect significant income streams also
interfere with normal commercial exploitation, unless no commercial transaction
or license is possible under the circumstances. To pass the test, an exception
must thus be narrowly defined (the first step) and touch essentially peripheral
income streams.
131. United States-Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 109 at p ara. 6.229.
132. This is reirforced by a later finding by an arbitration panel, which had been convened to decide the level of
harm caused by the US refusal to modify its law to brirg it into conformity with the Panel's findings. Under
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understarding (DSU) that govers the WTO dispute-settlement process, a
party may ask for arbitration if another party fails to implement an adopted panel (or Appellate Body)
decision. Because the US failed to implement the Panel report, the European Unior
ke
arbitratior
and
a decision on the level of harm, which was determined to be approximately $1.3 million per year. The
Europear Union has proposed levyirg a fee on copyrighted material agairst Uited States rationals unless
the Urited States reforms its law. See United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. CopyrightAct (Complaint by
the European Communities) (I March 2002) WTO Doc. WT/DS160/22 (Commurication from the Arbitrator),
<http://docsonlire.wto.org/GEN-highLightParert.asp?qu-%28 /40meta /5FSymbol+WT
FCDS160%FC%2A

%29&doc-D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F160%2D22%2EDOC%2EHTM>

United

States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act (Complaintby the European Communities) (19 February
2002), WTO Doc. WT/DS160/21 (Note by the Secretariat), <http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-highLightParent.

asp?qu-%28%40meta%SFSymbol+WTFCDS160%FC%2A%29&doc- D%3A%2 FD DFDOCUM ENTS%2 FT%2
FWT%2FDS%2F160%2D21%2EDOC%2EHTM> United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act
(Complaintby the European Communities) (11 January 2002), WTO Doc. WT/DS160/19 (Recourse by the
Europear Commurities to Article 22.2 of the DSU), <http://docsorline.wto.org/GEN-highL ghtParent.asp?qu

-%28%40meta%5FSymbo+WT%FCDS160%FC%2A%29&doc-D%3A%2FDD FDOCUMENTS%2FT%2 FWT%2
FDS%2F 60%2D1 9%2EDOC%2EHTM>; United States Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act (Complaint
by the European Communities) (15 Jaruary 2001), WTO Doc. WT/DS160/12 (Award of the Arbitrator), <http://
docsorlire.wto.org/G EN ig LightParert.asp?qu- / 28 /40meta
5FSymbol+WT /FCDS160%FC%2A%29&d

oc D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2 FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F160%2D1 2%2 EDC%2E HTM>.
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Could a public interest justification "compensate" for prima facie
incompatibility? A limitation (with compensation negating the loss of income)
would pass the third step of the test. However, meeting the requirements of the
second step is more difficult. If a rightsholder can show that the exception
prevents him from exploiting a "market," then the normative quality of the
justification would not necessarily compensate for the lost income. It becomes a
matter of degree and, yes, balance.
That said, "public interest" remains completely relevant. As Part I has
endeavoured to demonstrate, it has always formed part of international
copyright law and policy. It was also used successfully as a defence in a few UK
cases, but those cases dealt with particular works (for example, a photograph of
Princess Diana on the day of her accident or the text of a ministerial briefing
note 133) and not with classes of works or users. In addition, in those cases users
had a positive right to exercise against the copyright: namely, freedom of
expression and information.
It would thus be theoretically possible to consider a provision allowing
courts not to enforce copyright when a countervailing public interest justification
supports this application. Others might argue that this is unnecessary because
courts can (based on equitable rules) refuse certain remedies (for example,
injunctions). More importantly, such an "exceptional cases" exception would not
address broader concerns in education, research, or other similar areas.
In sum, the three-step test restricts the availability of uncompensated
exceptions. 13 4 The second step prohibits open-ended exceptions that
demonstrably affect core or significant income streams.
How can a rightsholder demonstrate the existence of a market? If a
market is already established in Canada for the form of exploitation concerned,
then the burden of proof is easily met. If that is not the case, the rightsholder
could demonstrate the existence of a market in a different yet relevant
jurisdiction. For example, if a US rightsholder could show that an important
market is successfully exploited in the United States, but that the rightholder is
prevented from doing so in Canada because of an exception, then prima facie
incompatibility is established.
A more difficult question is the impact on prospective markets.
Interpreting the test as applying only to established markets might stifle
investment in new technology and new markets. Conversely, interpreting the test
to consider interference with any prospective market, no matter how remote,
would basically prohibit almost all exceptions. The test does not go that far. First,
the interference must affect an income stream (whether actual or prospective)
133. Ashdown v Telegraph Group, Ltd., 2001 EWCA Civ 1142, <http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bir/markup.cgi?doc-/
ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1142.htmI&q ueryashdowr&method boolean>, 2002 Law Reports, Chancery
Division 149, 2002:6 Reports of Patent, Design and Trade Mark Cases 235; Hyde Park Residence Ltd v
Yelland et al., 2000 EWCA Civ 37, <http://www.bailii.org/cgi-'bin/markup.cgi?doc-/ew/cases/EWCA/
Civ/2000/37. html &query Hydeard+Park+and+ Residerce+ard+
L mited&methodboolear>, 2001 Law
Reports, Chancery Division 143, (2000) Ertertainmert and Media Law Reports 363.
134. As Okediji notes in "Toward An international Fair Use Doctrire," (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 75-176, at p. 112:
The option of using compulsory licensing urder the auspices of Article 9(2) places some pressure

on the interpretation ofwhat qualifies as a "special case" particularly here free use is permitted
by national legislation as is th
se with the American fair use doctrire. The possibility of a
compulsory license scheme urder Article 9(2) suggests tha the Berne Convertior does rot
generally favor "free use" as a legitimate paradigm for access to copyrighted works.
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that is sufficiently close to the centre of the target.
market must be reasonably predictable.13
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Second, the prospective

3.3. Impact of the Test on Policy
The first lesson to be drawn is that the three-step test is in reality a two-step test
when applied directly in national law because the "special case" nature of an
exception is but an instruction addressed to lawmakers to provide reasonably
narrow exceptions (a quantitative component), with a well-defined public interest
justification (the normative/qualitative component). As in the Section 110(5)
case, 136 the first step may be used (here by a WTO panel) to decide whether an
exception is sufficiently narrow. This argues against open-ended exceptions
because it is hard to defend an exception when its outer limits, whether in
quantity or purpose, cannot be readily ascertained.
The second step of the test prohibits exceptions that interfere
demonstrably with commercial exploitation. The focus here is akin to a finding of
adverse trade impact in an antidumping case: 13 7 will the measure significantly
prevent a rightsholder from maximizing revenue? It is clear from all interpretations
of the test that normalcy of exploitation modes is not a purely empirical (and
then necessarily mostly historical) notion. In other words, it is not simply a
question of what modes are actively exploited now, but also of what modes are
likely to become significant income streams. To recall the Stockholm Conference's
phrase noted above, the test covers "all forms of exploiting a work which had,
or were likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical importance."
Determining what is likely to acquire importance is educated guesswork.
However, courts should look at market developments and ask rightsholders to
make at least a prima facie case of interference. Once the case has been made,
however, it would seem reasonable that the burden should shift to the user to
show that there is no interference.
The third step is a logical extension of the second: If there is no
interference because the exception does not significantly impinge upon the
rightsholders' mode(s) of commercial exploitation, then perhaps the rightsholders
can still show a substantial loss of income. If that loss of income is unreasonable,
then financial compensation should be provided.
Both the incorporation of the three-step test in international copyright
law by the TRIPS Agreement (which went well beyond the Berne Convention in
this regard) and, more broadly, the movement of copyright from a property right
based on natural law to a trade-related right may have made it easier to provide
exceptions. This is because the approach taken is not, or is no longer, concerned
with the theoretical interference with a property right (by analogy, actual damage
is not required to establish a cause of action in trespass to land), but is rather a
pragmatic approach involving the actual impact on rightsholders.
135. As was decided by the French Supreme Civil Court in 2006 (Cour de cassation): Cassation Civile 1, 28
February 2006, <http://www.courdecassatior.fr/jurisprudence

publications documertation 2/actualite

jurisprudence 21/premiere chambre civile 568/arrets 569/05 16.002 8777.html>, La Semaine Juridique:
Juris Classeur Periocdique 2006. 11.10084 (Anrot. A. Lucas).
136. See United States-Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 109.
137. 1use this analogy because the incorporation of copyright rules in the WTO framework, where disputes are
decided by trade experts, leads to a rapprochement of trade and intellectual property rules.

32

university of ottawa law & technology journal

www.uoltj.ca

Put differently, as a result of the paradigmatic nature of the three-step
test, the policy focus is not whether a technical restricted act (reproduction,
adaptation, communication, etc.) has taken place, but: (a) whether revenue will
be (demonstrably) lost because of lost (normal, i.e. reasonably expected)
commercial transactions; and (b) whether the loss is proportionally justified on
public policy grounds. One then looks at how many dollars will be lost and
whether a compensation mechanism should be put in place.
3.4. Scope of Application of the Three-Step Test
One crucial issue that remains after the above analysis of the three-step test is to
determine to which exceptions and limitations the test applies. Specifically, to
which limitations and exceptions does the test as it is contained in article 13 of
the TRIPS Agreement apply, in a dispute-settlement context in particular? First,
does it apply to exceptions existing at the time the TRIPS Agreement came into
force or only to those adopted afterwards (January 1, 1995 for countries other
than developing and least-developed ones)?138 Second, does it apply only to
general exceptions or also to use- or user-specific exceptions provided for
specifically in the Berne Convention or the TRIPS Agreement? The answer to the
first question was given in the 110(5) case: 13 9 the test applies both to exceptions
in place at the time of entry into force and those adopted afterwards.
The second question is more difficult to answer. It would seem
unnecessary to apply the three-step test as a further barrier to validity because,
as a matter of treaty interpretation, exceptions such as articles 10(1) and 10(2) of
the Convention include a different test, namely the reference to compatibility
with fair practice. While this position is defensible, it does not solve the issue
entirely. Respected commentators have expressed the view that this reference to
"fair practice" should be interpreted as a rule of reason referring back to the
three-step test. 140 This view may be adopted by a WTO panel, notably to simplify
and enhance the uniformity of standards used to interpret the Berne Convention
(and in turn by the TRIPS Agreement in which it was incorporated).
Additionally, those specific exceptions contain other limitations. First,
with regards to the use of the words "by way of illustration," there is controversy
as to whether the whole of a work may be used "for illustration." However,
leading commentators believe that, in appropriate circumstances, the use of an
entire work may be acceptable. 141Second, records from the successive revision
Conferences of the Berne Convention show that "teaching" as used in article 10
comprises elementary as well as advanced teaching and works intended for selfinstruction. 142 But there is considerable debate as to whether commercial (forprofit) teaching activities can benefit from the exception.1 43 Finally, article 10(2)
extends the exception to include works in a broadcast for schools or other
138.

TRIPS Agreemert, supra rote 5 at art.65.

139. United States-Section 110(5)
Panel Report, supra rote 109 atpara. 6.94 (" neither
the express wordirg nor the
context ofArticle
13 or any other provision
ofthe TRIPS Agreement supports the interpretation thatthe scope
of application
ofArticle
13 islimited
to the exclusive
rights
newly introduced under the TRIPS Agreement.")
140. Ricketsor ard Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, supra rote 106 at s.13.45.
141. Ricketsorard Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights,
supra rote 106 at s.13.45.
142. Ricketsor ard Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, supra rote 106 at s.13.45.
143. Ricketsor ard Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, supra rote 106 at s.13.45,
Thomas Dreierand P Bernt Hugerholtz, eds, Concise European Copyright Law (Kluwer Law, 2006) at p.45.
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educational institutions, but not to on-demand transmissions. The Convention
144
treats broadcasting and transmissions (article 11 bis(l)) differently.
The three-step test thus may apply as a proxy for the rule of reason
contained in articles 10(1) and 10(2) of the Berne Convention through the
reference to fair practice. Conversely, because the exceptions contained in
articles 10bis(1) 145 and (2)146 of the Convention do not contain this reference to
fair practice, they would not be subject to the three-step test. However, article
10bis(l) allows rightsholders to prevent recourse to this exception and article
10bis(2) includes a reference to the justification of the extent of the use, which
seems to be a different and less demanding threshold than the three-step test.
Another consideration is whether the test applies to limitations expressly
provided for in the Berne Convention, such as compulsory licences for mechanical
reproduction or retransmission. There are two reasons to think it would not. That
being said, there is also a strong reason to think it would: article 13 of the TRIPS
Agreement provides that WTO Members must "confine limitations or exceptions"
(generally) to those that pass the three steps of the test. At first glance, this
covers all limitations and exceptions, including compulsory licenses. Indeed, the
history of article 13 suggests a broad scope of application, including to all
so-called minor exceptions and a prohibition of compulsory licenses other than
those expressly provided for in the Convention. 147 There, are however, two
arguments not to apply the test to licenses expressly provided for in the
Convention. First, the Convention specifically expresses those limitations in clear,
unlimited terms, though using different legal techniques. 148 Second, especially if
the application of the three-step test is applied to an exception otherwise
provided in the Convention, then arguably it must be read contextually, looking
at the Convention in its entirety. In cases where the Convention combines the
grant of a right with a possible compulsory license, the right is arguably not, or
is no longer, exclusive. Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement applies only to
"exclusive rights." Additionally, as a matter of internal coherence, while it may
make sense to apply the test "across the board," as it were, why provide for
some, but not all, possible exceptions in the Convention and the Agreement
(and then superimpose the three-step test)?
It should also be mentioned that the test would not apply to exclusions
from copyright protection, such as those contained in articles 2(2), 2(4), 2(7) and
2bis(l) of the Berne Convention (respectively unfixed works; "official texts of a
legislative, administrative and legal nature, and to official translations of such
144. Ricketsor and Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, supra rote 106 at s. 13.45.
145. Berne Convention, supra rote 4 at art. 1Obis(1):
reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the communication to the public by wire of
articles published ir newspapers or periodicals or current economic, political or religious topics,
and of broadcast works of the same character, ir cases ir which the reproduction, broadcasting
or such communication thereof is not expressly reserved.
146. Berne Convention, supra rote 4 at art. IObis(2): reproduction and making available to the public "for the
purpose of reporting current events by means of photography, cinematography, broadcasting or
communication to the public by wire, literary or artistic works seen or heard in the course of the event may,
to the extent justified by the informatory purpose [...1."
147. Ge rva is The TRIPS Agreement, supra rote 101 at pp. 144-147.
148. Berne Convention, supra rote 4: In arts. 11 bis(2) and (3), the Convention uses the ubiquitous "[it shall be a
matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions [...]", while in art. 13(l), it is
expressed as a possible reservation or cordition "Each country of the Union may impose for itself
reservations and conditions or the exclusive right grantedt the author of a musical work [.... "
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texts"; works of applied art; and "political speeches and speeches delivered in
the course of legal proceedings") or in article 9(2) of the TRIPS Agreement
("ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such").
Those are not limitations or exceptions to exclusive copyright rights proper, but
are rather statements of exclusion of subject matter. In other words, the provision
deals with the type of works to which copyright applies and not to the scope of
rights, which is the focus of limitations and exceptions (as the term is used in the
Berne Convention and this Article).
3.5. Locus of the Three-Step Test
A question closely related to the issue of whether the three-step test applies in
addition to the (few) additional exceptions contained in the Berne Convention is
at which level it applies. Is it merely an international norm or does it, or could it,
apply at the national level? 149 In countries where international treaty norms are

directly applicable in the national legal order, this would be the case, which raises
interesting interpretative issues. Clearly, however, the direct application of the
test in national legislation is becoming more widespread.
The European Union's Information Society ("InfoSoc") Directive"'0
contains exceptions that are all purpose-specific. In other words, there is no set
of criteria comparable to the US fair use doctrine."' However, the preamble to
this Directive, which serves as a guideline for the interpretation of the operative
part of the text,15 2 refers to "permitting exceptions or limitations in the public
interest for the purpose of education and teaching" 53 and to the need to
safeguard a "fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories
of rightsholders, as well as between the different categories of rightsholders and
users"15 4 through exceptions and limitations, which "have to be reassessed in the
light of the new electronic environment." '55 The InfoSoc Directive also refers to
the three-step test as an overarching test for all permitted exceptions. Article
5(5) reads:
The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall
only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work or other subject matter and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.1 1
149. Inthe now famousMulholland Drivecase, a consumer organization argued thatanti-circumvertion

technology (TPM)prevented the making ofa (lawful)
private
copy.The Court of First Instance
inParis
refused to grant the relief
sought.The Paris
Court ofAppeal disagreed and concluded that
there was no
evidence thatprivate copying would interfere
with normal commercial exploitation.
The Civil
Supreme
Court (cour de cassation) found thatcopying ofdigital
copies of a film
could constitute
a violation
of at
least
the second step (normal commercial exploitatior):
M. Stephane P, UFC Que Choisir c/SA Films Alain
,
Sarde, SA Universal pictures video France et autres, Cassatior Civile
31 30 April
2004, <http://www.
foruminternet.org/telechargemert/documerts/tgi par20040430.pdf>, "Attendu que lacope d'l
oeuvre
filmographique 6ditee sur support numerique ne peut ainsi
que porter atteinte a /Pexploitationnormale de
'oeuvre" (emphasis added). Note the double negative.
150. EC, Directive 2001129/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, (2001) Official
Journal of the European Union L 167/10, <http://eu lex.europa.eu/LexUrServ/LexUriServ.do?ur-OJ:L:2001:
167:0010:0019:EN:PDF> [InfoSoc
Directive].
151.US Copyright Act, supra rote 8 ats.107.
152. InfoSoc Directive, supra rote 150, preamble.
153. InfoSoc Directive, supra rote 150 at para. 14.
154. InfoSoc Directive, supra rote 150 at para. 31.
155. Infosoc Directive, supra note 150 atpara. 31.
156. Infosoc Directive, supra note 150 atart.
5, para. 5.
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The reference to the test is seen as a "guiding principle" rather than an
effective means to effectively harmonize exceptions in the national laws of the 27
EU Member States. l 7 Indeed, at the level of national laws, the three-step test
may be refined by enumerating certain specific cases l" 8 or by providing additional
guidance on the interpretation of the three steps. It remains a flexible test that
could, however, be used by courts in cases where no such specific exception
exists, if permitted under domestic law. The EU reference to the three-step test
in the InfoSoc Directive may also be interpreted as a commitment to the test as
a guide for regional policy, but not necessarily as the expression of the view that
it is the best normative tool at the level of national laws.
The InfoSoc Directive is not the first to refer to the test. A version of the
test is also included in the Software Directive, where it is used both as a guide in
the preamble l"9 and as a restriction on the scope of exceptions in article 6(3).161
It is also contained in article 8(2) of the Database Directive, where it forms part
161
of the main provisions.
In implementing the InfoSoc Directive, a number of EU Member States
decided to include the test. In doing so, however, they usually skipped the first
step, presumably because they took the view 162 that there are really only two

operational steps. 163 EU countries where steps 2 and 3 form part of national law
now include at least: Croatia, France, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
There is another clear illustration of the trend to incorporate the threestep test in national legislation. In Australia, the Copyright Amendment Act

157. Serftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three Step Test, supra note 124 at pp. 246 248.
158. Bernt Hugenholtz, "Why the Copyright Directive Is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid," (2000) 22:11
European Intellectual Property Review 499-505, <http://www.ivir.rl/publications/hugenholtz/opinion-EIPR.
html > at p. 501:
What makes the Directive a total failure, in terms of harmorisation, is that the exemptions
allowed under Article 5 are optional, not mandatory (except for 5.1). Member States are not
obliged to implement the entire list, but may pick and choose at will. It is expected that most
Member States will prefer to keep intact their national laws as much as possible. At best, some
countries will add one or two exemptions from the list, now bearing the E.C.'s seal of approval.
So much for approximatior
See also an illuminating study prepared for the European Commission on the IrfoSoc Directive, recently
made available by the University of Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law, Study on the Implementation
and Effect in Member States' Laws of Directive 20011291EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (Final Report) (University of Amsterdam, February
2007), <http://www.ivir.rl/publications/guibault/Irfosoc report 2007.pdf>.
159. Computer Programs Directive, supra rote 39 at preamble: "such an exception to the author's exclusive
rights may not be used in a way which prejudices the legitimate interests of the rightholde r rwhich
conflicts with a normal exploitation of the program [...]."
160. Computer Programs Directive, supra rote 39 at art. 6(3): "the provisions o this Article may not be
interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in a manner which unreasonably prejudices
the right holder's legitimate interests or conflicts with a normal exploitation of the computer program."
161. EC, Directive 96191EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 1 March 1996 on the legal
protection of databases, (1996) Official Journal of the European Union L 077, 002 0028, <http://eur lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-CELEX:31996LOO:09EN:HTML>
at art. 8(2):
A lawful user of a database which is made available to the public in whatever manner may not
perform acts which conflict with normal exploitation of the database or unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the maker of the database.
162. Gervals, The TRIPS Agreement, supra rote 101 at pp. 144 147.
163. The Greek copyright law also contains the first step. See Greece, Law 212111993, Copyright,Related Rights
and Cultural Matters, as last amended by Law No. 2435 of 2003, <http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs rew/pdf/
en/gr/gr219en.pdf>a art. 28C (added by art. 81(2) of Law no. 3057/2002): "The limitations provided for in
Section IV of Law 2121/1993, as exists, shall orly be applied in certain special cases which do rot conflict
with a normal exploitation ofthe work or other protected subject-matter and do rot unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the rightholder"
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2006,164 which received Royal Assent on December 11, 2006, contains the
following provision:
Section 200AB: Use of works and other subject-matter for certain purposes
(1) The copyright in a work or other subject-matter is not infringed by a
use of the work or other subject-matter if all the following conditions
exist:
(a) the circumstances of the use (including those described in
paragraphs (b), (c) and (d)) amount to a special case;

(b) the use is covered by subsection (2), (3)or (4);
(c) the use does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or
other subject-matter;
(d) the use does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the owner of the copyright.
This provision applies to exceptions contained in that section, but not
(by operation of sections 200AB(1)(b) and 200AB(6)) if the use of the work is noninfringing for another reason (such as a reproduction of less than a substantial
part or a limitation on the right itself, as for example in the provision concerning
the making of a Braille version of a published literary work, which contains what
amounts to a compulsory license).
The three-step test was not only incorporated in the Australian provision
(all three steps, contrary to most other national implementations which focus
only on the last two): it was a central consideration in preparing this Bill. In
addition to being addressed directly to courts in section 200AB, the three-step
test was used to justify limitations in the formulation of exceptions. For example,
on private copying the Government declared during the debate on the Bill: "The
'one copy in each format' condition is to protect copyright owners from this
exception being abused, as well as to ensure that the exception complies with
the three-step test."165
A Senate Committee struck to examine the constitutionality of the Bill
noted that it had "received evidence which highlighted opposing views on how
the three-step test should be implemented in domestic legislation. Proposed
section 200AB seeks to provide an open-ended exception in line with the US
model, and allows courts to determine if other uses should be permitted as
exceptions to copyright." 166 Critics pointed to the lack of clarity of the test and
167
the move towards a "lawyer-based copyright regime-a litigious model."

164. Australia (Commorwealth), Copyright Amendment Act 2006, no. 158, <http://www.com aw.gov.au/ComLaw/

Legislatior/Act1 .sf/O/E53C3691 BD9BAAOACA25730700 B2EC7/$file/1582006.pdf> (emphasis added).
165.

Submission 69A to the Senate Standirg Committee or Legal and Constitutional Affairs re Provisions of the
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006, 8 November 2006, <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legconctte/copyrightO6/submissions/sub69A.pdf>at p. 3.

166.

Australia, Commonwealth, Senate, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs:
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 [Provisions], (Report) (Senate Printing Unit, 2006), <http://www.aph.gov.au/
senate/committee/legcor ctte/copyright06/report/report.pdf>at p. 24 [Senate Report on Copyright
Amendment Bill 20061.

167. Senate Report or CopyrightAmendment Bill 2006, supra rote 166 at pp. 24 25.
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The Government's response on this key point was as follows:
We are aware that some user interests think that it is unduly restrictive. Given
that the three-step test already has to be complied with, there is an argument
that should be enough, that the government should go as far as the threestep test allows. But we note in passing that the three-step test is not an
obligation; you only have to go as far as you can go under the treaty
obligations. The government is also aware that some copyright owner
interests think that the provision is too broad and that the commercial
advantage test should be narrowed even further. In the present drafting the
government has sought to find a balance between those interests, recognising
that this is a new exception that is different in form to some of the specific
exceptions already in the Copyright Act. Therefore, the government is
minded to try to balance what are reasonable interests on both sides-the
copyright owners and users. [...]

The Government introduced the "commercial advantage" test in recognition
of concerns about the potential scope of the new exception. Indeed the
Government notes arguments on behalf of some copyright owners that
s. 200AB is presently too wide in being potentially available to for- profit
schools and libraries in commercial companies and should be narrowed so
that no commercial advantage, direct or indirect, can be obtained from
reliance on this section.168

For its part, the Labor party (which, incidentally, has formed the
government since November 24, 2007) noted the following in the Senate report:
Labor Senators are of the view that the particular way the Government has
chosen to embody the three-step test in the Bill is problematic and an
example of poor drafting that will no doubt lead to confusion and uncertainty
in practice. Not only will judges be required to interpret the three-step test,
but so will the users to which the exceptions apply. This is not only impractical,
but also potentially costly to those user groups who may have to seek expert
169
advice on how to properly interpret the three-step test.

The 2006 Australian Act is an almost ironclad guarantee of TRIPS
compatibility, which was clearly a dominant consideration in making the policy
decision. Only if Australian courts were to stray too far from WTO panel
interpretations would a possible case of incompatibility with TRIPS be made. This
is highly unlikely because their deliberations will no doubt be guided in that
respect by section 200AB(7), which defines "conflict with a normal exploitation"
and "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests" as having "the same
meaning as in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement." The new provision is still too
recent to have been interpreted by courts.

168. Serate Report or CopyrightAmendment Bill 2006, supra rote 166 atpp. 25-26.

169. Serate Report or Copyri9 ht Amendment Bill 2006, supra rote 166 atp.47.
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From the above, a few concluding observations can be made. First, the
three-step test is emerging as an unavoidable norm in copyright law but also in
other areas of intellectual property.170 The test was originally conceived as a
political compromise to limit exceptions to the right of reproduction. Its
extension to all copyright rights and to other areas of intellectual property is
likely a reflection of both the flexible nature of the test and the pragmatic
approach of the trade negotiators who drafted the TRIPS Agreement. Second,
the locus of the test is unstable. There remains a considerable margin of
uncertainty with respect to its domestic application by national courts. The first
step is generally not universally viewed as a message addressed to law-makers
to narrow the scope of the application of exceptions. The third step seems to
require compensation for exceptions that, while justified, cause a significant
degree of harm. This could in theory be implemented by a national court, but
would be more appropriately the subject of arbitration or an administrative
proceeding (in that it would resemble tariff-setting processes). 171 This leaves the
second step, namely interference with normal commercial exploitation, a
dynamic and evolving notion, at the center of the picture.
This will not be unfamiliar to those familiar with fair use jurisprudence in
the United States and, more particularly, the Folsom test. 172 Courts must,

according to Folsom, "in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and
the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
173
supersede the objects, of the original work."
The US fair use doctrine was codified in 1976 and "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" is the fourth and
last of the criteria mentioned in section 107 of the US Copyright Act. 174 In Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises, 17 the US Supreme Court stated that
the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use,"176 adding that once a copyright holder had established "with reasonable
probability the existence of a causal connection between the infringement and a
loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the infringer to show that this
damage would have occurred had there been no taking of copyrighted
expression."

177

170. Ircludingpaterts ard designs ir TRIPS Agreement, supra rote 5 at arts.
26 and 30.
171. For example, ir the United States see Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of2004, Pub. L. no.

108-419, <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi bir/getdoc.cgi?dbrame-108-cong-public
laws&docid-f:pub1419.108.pdf> from which the Copyright Royalty Board derivesitsstatutory
authority. In
Carada see Copyright Act, supra rote 38 ats. 66 ard folk(establishing
the Copyright Board of Carada).
172. So ramed because ofJustice Story's famous decisiorin Folsom vMarch (US 1stCir,1841), 9 Federal Cases
342 [Folsom v March].

173. Folsom v March, supra note 172 atp.348.
174. US Copyright Act, supra rote 8 at s.107. The three other criteria are the purpose and character of the use,
including
whether such use isof a commercial rature or isfor ronprofit educational purposes; the nature of
the copyrighted work, and the amourt and substartiality
of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted
work as a whole.
175. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.v Nation Enterprises (USA SC, 1985),<http://caselaw.1p.firdlaw.com/scripts/
getcase.pl?court-us&vol-471 &invol-539>, 471 United States Supreme Court Reports 539. The Nation
magazire had obtained an unauthorized copy of the soor to be published manuscript of the memoirs of
ex-president Gerald Ford. Itquoted 300 words from the memoirs. The Nation claimed thatthe relatively
smalltakirg was fair
use. The district
courtfoundt
the use of the material was irfrirgirg, which was
reversed by a 2-1 decision of the Court of Appeals forthe Second Circuit.
The focus atthe Supreme Court
(based on Folsom v March, supra rote 172) was on whether the fair use superseded the use of the original.
176. Harper & Row Publishers, supra note 175 at p.566.
177. Harper & Row Publishers, supra note 175 at p.567.
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US fair use jurisprudence shows that at least the second step of the test
may be used by national courts. It acts as a proxy for determining fairness of the
use. Perhaps this will mean broader application of US fair use cases in other
jurisdictions. A similar situation occurred with respect to originality after the US
Supreme Court found in a 1991 case178 that a modicum of creativity was
179
constitutionally required to benefit from copyright protection.

4. CONCLUSION : THE WAY FORWARD
HISTORICALLY, AUTHORS' RIGHTS WERE ANCHORED in the public interest, one that requires

a working copyright system for the benefit of authors and users of copyright works.
The public interest requires a balance, one that may impose limits on exclusive
copyright rights. At the international level, this principle has formed part of the
normative framework since before the inception of the Berne Convention in 1886,
which recognizes, for example, the quotation right (as a mandatory exception) and
the rights of, broadly speaking, a free press. As rights were added to the Convention,
normative work on limitations and exceptions remained largely non-systematic and
conceptually unsatisfactory. The situation has now become much more complex
owing to the emergence and increasing presence of copyright in the private sphere
of users and consumers, and the new role of users in generating and disseminating
"content." Those users have rights, such as the right to privacy or rights contained
in consumer protection statutes, that clash with copyright. New equilibria, both
within copyright and in relation to these other bodies of law, must be found. This
article has tried to offer a context for the formulation of limitations and exceptions
at the international level and a conceptualization of the principles that should
undergird such limitations and exceptions.
Those principles should first be operationalized in a new international
protocol that could be negotiated to recognize both mandatory and declaratory
limitations and exceptions, thus providing guidance on the interpretation and
application of the three-step test.18 ° This instrument would list the underlying
principles of limitations and exceptions in a preamble, provide for specific
exceptions in a few provisions, and state compatibility with (and possible
interpretation of) the three-step test in an accompanying statement.
Second, the WTO could adopt a Ministerial Declaration, at least with
respect to the exceptions that apply more directly to developing countries. For
instance the 1971 Appendix to the Berne Convention contains a series of
administrative measures, few of which are required to meet the underlying
developmental objectives and safeguard the rightsholders' interests. A
Declaration could state, for example, that WTO Members will not use the WTO
178. Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. (USA SC, 1991), <http://caselaw.1p.firdlaw.com/
scripts/getcase.pl?court-us&vol-499&irvol-340>, 499 United States Supreme Court Reports 340.
179. See Daniel Gervais, "Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright

Law," (2002) 49 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 949-981, <http://papers.ssrr.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract !d-733603#Pape rDownlad>.
180. P Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L Okediji, Conceiving An International Instrument On Limitations And
Exceptions To Copyright: Final Report (6 March 2008), <http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugerholtz/
limitatiors-exceptiors-copyright.pdf>.

40

university of ottawa law & technology journal

www.uoltj.ca

dispute-settlement mechanism in respect of violations of those unessential parts
of the Appendix (thereby making it easier and simpler to use). Easier and
broader use of the Appendix may prompt rightsholders, especially publishers, to
respond better to the needs of the developing world.
Third, a set of principles could be developed to explicate the issues
arising from the unregulated nature of the policy space reserved for limitations
and exceptions, and to provide information and guidance to national policy
makers and courts. This would be helpful in light of not only extant state practice
but also of emerging understandings about the impact of a properly calibrated
intellectual property regime to stimulate domestic innovation policies and
cultural development, including the amelioration of educational systems.181
Operationally, as a number of countries have begun doing, the threestep test could be used to craft limitations and exceptions that allow use for
public interest purposes that do not demonstrably affect commercial exploitation.
When a substantial loss of income can be shown to exist or be reasonably
foreseen based on relevant experiences in other jurisdictions as a result of an
exception, then a compensation mechanism can be put in place. Exceptions
based on Articles 10 and 10bis of the Berne Convention as well as exclusions
based on Articles 2 and 2bis of the Convention would remain unaffected by the
test and the need to provide for compensation.
As a political matter, because the objectives of defining proper
limitations and exceptions are not incompatible with the fight against commercial
piracy, the two issues could be joined in a single new instrument with a view to
increasing enforcement measures available against "pirates," 18 2 while recognizing
the principles and application of limitations and exceptions. This type of dualpurpose instrument would be a forceful refocusing of copyright on its core
mission and the purpose for which it was originally designed.
As a parallel set of measures, especially in grey areas that are likely to
lead to heavy litigation (especially in cases where revenue streams could be
affected), contractual solutions could be encouraged, notably by furthering
international research in this area. In broad-ranging licensing agreements,
including recourse to extended collective repertoires (which essentially transforms
a collective scheme from opt-in to opt-out and seems compatible with both the
Berne Convention and TRIPS183), parties could agree to disagree on the exact
scope of an exception and/or the three-step test but agree to pay both a
licensing fee for uses that require an authorization and a (discounted) fee for the
grey area possibly covered by the exception. Logically, in countries where such a
mechanism is available, 184 governmental authorities setting collective tariffs
181. See generally DanielGervais, ed. Intellectual Property Trade and Development (Oxford University Press, 2007).

182. As was done inthe TRIPS Agreemert, supra rote 5 atart.
61,I refer
here tothose who infringe
copyright
knowirgly and or a commercial scale.
183. See Daniel Gervals, "Application of an Extended Collective
LicensingRegime n Canada: Principles
and
IssuesRelated to Implemertation," (Study prepared forthe Department of Canadian Heritage) (2003)
<http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/regime/regime e.pdf>.
184. For examplete Copyright Board of Canada determined the scope of the research and educational
exceptions ina decision concerning a tariff
filedby the reprography collective
Access Copyright forcertain
educational uses. See statement of Royalties
to be Collected by Access Copyright for the Reprographie
Reproduction, in Canada, of Works in its Repertoire (Educational Institutions 2005 2009), Decision of 26
June 2009, corrected on 17 July2009, <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisiors/2009/Access-Copyright-20052009-Schools.pdf>. At para. 89, the Board noted: "Research occurs provided thateffort isput intofinding,
regardless of itsnature or intensity."
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could take account of both exceptions and the three-step test, and adapt tariffs
to reflect the exceptions appropriately.
Naturally these three ways forward are not mutually exclusive.

